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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal of 
the Pratt's Amended Complaint based on the judicial proceeding privilege. 
Standard of Review: "Under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to 
dismiss is proper 'only where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be 
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to 
support their claim.' ... 'Because we consider only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, 
we grant the trial court's ruling no deference and review it for correctness.' " Bennett v. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9 130, 70 P.3d 17 (citations omitted). 
To the extent Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion was converted one for summary judgment 
by offering the document they published at their press conference, "In reviewing a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment, we give no deference to its conclusions of law. 
Instead, we review the grant of summary judgment for correctness. ... c[W]e review the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.' " Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2004 UT 11 
13, 84 P.3d 1197. 
Preservation of Issue: R. 25-27, 34-47, 48-57, 62-138, 142-151. 
ISSUE 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal of 
the Pratt's Amended Complaint based on the group defamation rule. 
Standard of Review: Same as for Issue 1. 
Preservation of Issue: R. 207-214, 225-226, 227-228, 229-233. 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c): "The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of The Case. 
This appeal is before the Utah Supreme Court on certiori from a December 15, 
2005 Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, affirming a final order by the Honorable 
Michael G. Allphin, Second District Court, Davis County entered on August 17, 2004. 
On August 1, 2003, Defendant Mary Ann Roe l assisted by her attorneys White, 
Morris, Mark, and McKay, Burton & Thurman, filed a Complaint in Third District Court 
against David O. Kingston and Daniel Kingston for various alleged batteries and other 
torts. They also named some 242 other individual defendants including the Pratts, alleging 
infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and other torts, falsely claiming the Pratts 
had assisted, encouraged, or knew of and failed to prevent or report the alleged torts of 
David and Daniel Kingston. The Complaint was assigned to the Honorable William W. 
Barrett and is hereafter referred to as the Barrett Complaint. 
On August 28, 2003, Defendants held a press conference at which they distributed 
copies of the Barrett Complaint to the press media, and also published verbal statements 
stating that the defendants including the Pratts had done things to injure Roe. 
She is married. The Pratts have learned her married name is Mary Ann Nichols. 
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The Pratts then filed this action, alleging among other things that Defendants' 
publications at the press conference and the resulting publicity defamed them. 
On Defendants' motion to dismiss, converted to one for summary judgment when 
Defendants submitted the Barrett Complaint with their Reply Memorandum, the Trial 
Court held that Defendants' republication at the press conference of Roe's Complaint was 
protected by the judicial proceeding privilege, and that as a matter of law no reasonable 
juror could find any of Defendants' publications could be construed to refer to the Pratts. 
The Pratts appealed to the Court of Appeals, which among other things held (a) it was 
precluded by the invited error doctrine from reversing the trial court on the judicial 
proceeding privilege, and (b) without looking at the Complaint against the Pratts, 
Defendants' publications were not defamatory under the group defamation rule. The Pratts 
petitioned this Court for certiorari, which the Court granted on the issues discussed herein. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court, 
02/11/04 The Pratts filed their Complaint. [R. 1-12] 
03/04/04 Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss. [R. 25-27] 
03/15/04 The Pratts filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 
[R. 48-58] 
03/24/04 Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
[R. 142-151] 
05/07/04 The Trial Court issued an Order stating Defendants' Reply Memorandum 
raised for the first time a judicial privilege argument, and allowing the 
Pratts eight days to respond solely to that argument. [R. 198-199] 
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06/17/04 The Pratts filed their Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Based on Judicial Privilege. [R. 229-233] 
06/23/04 Defendants filed Their Request to Submit for Decision on their Motion to 
Dismiss, which by their Reply Memorandum had been converted to one for 
summary judgment. [R. 215-218] 
06/23/04 Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Complaint Based on Judicial Privilege. 
[R. 212-214] 
07/16/04 The Pratts filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Strike the Pratts' Reply Memorandum. [R. 227-228] 
Defendants did not file a Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion to 
Strike. [Record generally] 
Defendants' Motion to Strike was not submitted for decision. [Record 
generally] 
07/16/04 The Pratts filed a Motion to Strike "Judicial Privilege" Argument in 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. [R. 
225-226] 
Plaintiffs did not oppose the Pratts' Motion to Strike "Judicial Privilege" 
Argument. [Record generally] 
08/17/04 The Trial Court entered its Ruling on all pending motions. [R. 234-251] 
09/01/04 The Pratts filed their Notice of Appeal. [R. 252-253] 
01/0305 The Pratts filed their Brief of Appellants with the Court of Appeals. 
02/0705 Defendants filed their Brief of Appellees with the Court of Appeals. 
03/14/05 The Pratts filed their Reply Brief of Appellants with the Court of Appeals. 
12/15/05 The Court of Appeals issued its Opinion for official publication. 
12/28/05 The Pratts filed their Petition for Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court. 
01/25/06 Defendants filed their Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari. 
03/27/06 The Supreme Court granted the Pratt's Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to 
the issues addressed in this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Based on the standard for review supra, the following facts apply to this appeal. 
1. On August 1, 2003, Defendant Mary Ann Roe (no known to be Mary Ann 
Nichols, see footnote 1 supra) through her attorneys, John Dustin Morris and William A. 
Mark of the law firm of McKay, Burton & Thurman, and Douglas F. White, filed a 
lawsuit in Third District Court, Civil No. 030917113PI, assigned to the Honorable 
William W. Barrett (the Barrett Complaint). [R63, 67-1361 
2 The caption of the Barrett Complaint identifies Nevin and Denise Pratt by 
name. [R73]. 
3T The body of the Barrett Complaint identifies Nevin Pratt and Denise Pratt by 
name, [R. 89], and defines "Order Members" specifically to mean Nevin and Denise Pratt 
among others. [R. 84-85] Every subsequent reference in the Barrett Complaint to "Order 
Members" therefor refers to Nevin Pratt and Denise Pratt. 
4. The Barrett Complaint identified Nevin Pratt and Denise Pratt by name as 
members of the Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc. (the cooperative, to whom 
Defendants referred as "the Co-op," "the Order," and "the Kingston organization"), 
against whom Defendants' at the press conference were directed. [R. 185 t 16] 
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5. Each of the statements in the Barrett Complaint about Nevin Pratt and Denise 
Pratt as "Order Members" was false. [R 6 1 25, 184 1 15, 186 t 19] The false statements 
in the Barrett Complaint about Nevin Pratt and Denise Pratt as "Order Members" include 
the following [R 183-184 1 14] : 
a. The Pratts, as "Order Members," planned, assisted, encouraged, allowed, aided 
and abetted in, or otherwise knew of, and in violation of a legal duty to do so, 
failed to act to prevent or to report to authorities a polygamous and incestuous 
marriage of Roe to Roe's uncle. 
b. The Pratts, as "Order Members," knew Roe's uncle would perpetrate acts of sexual 
abuse against Roe and did nothing to stop it despite a legal duty to do so. 
c. The Pratts, as "Order Members," encouraged, allowed, participated in, failed to 
report, or otherwise assisted Roe's uncle to commit four separate acts of sexual 
abuse of Roe. 
d. The Pratts, as "Order Members," encouraged, allowed, participated in, failed to 
report, or otherwise assisted Roe's father to viciously whip Roe across her back and 
legs, and to beat Roe's face and arms. 
e. The Pratts, as "Order Members," intended to cause Roe emotional distress. 
f. The Pratts, as "Order Members," acted with the purpose of causing, or in reckless 
disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional distress to Roe. 
g. The Pratts, as "Order Members," knew or should have realized the Pratts engaged 
in conduct that involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress to Roe. 
h. From facts known to the Pratts as "Order Members," they should have realized if 
they caused Roe emotional distress it might cause Roe illness or bodily harm. 
I. The conduct of the Pratts, as "Order Members," caused Roe emotional distress 
resulting in illness or bodily harm. 
j . The Pratts, as "Order Members," were part of a conspiracy (I) to force Roe into 
an illegal, incestuous, polygamous marriage to her uncle, (ii) to subject Roe to 
sexual abuse at the hand of Roe's uncle, and (iii) to subject Roe to physical abuse 
at the hand of Roe's father. 
k. The Pratts, as "Order Members," were partners in a general partnership with Roe's 
uncle, and that Roe was forced into an illegal, incestuous, polygamous marriage 
with Roe's uncle, and that Roe's uncle committed four separate acts of sexual abuse 
of Roe, all in the ordinary course of the business of the alleged partnership between 
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the Pratts and Roe's uncle, or with the Pratts' authority, knowledge, consent, or 
ratification as the uncle's business partners. 
1. The Pratts, as "Order Members," were partners in a general partnership with Roe's 
father, and that Roe's father savagely beat Roe in the ordinary course of the 
business of the alleged partnership, or with the Pratts' authority, knowledge, 
consent, or ratification as the father's business partners. 
m. Both Roe's uncle and Roes' father were agents of the Pratts as "Order Members," 
and that the acts of Roe's uncle and father as stated above were of the general kind 
and nature that the Pratts hired, directed, encouraged, consented, engaged, or 
ratified them to perform, and that the acts of Roe's uncle and father as stated above 
occurred within the ordinary scope and boundaries of their employment, direction, 
encouragement, consent, engagement, or ratification, and were motivated by the 
purpose of serving the Pratts' interest. 
n. The Pratts, as "Order Members," committed their acts or omissions as the result 
of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Roe. 
o. The Pratts, as "Order Members," caused Roe at least $10 million in damages. 
6. On August 28, 2003, Mary Ann and her attorneys John Morris, Douglas 
White, and William Mark were present at a press conference at the offices of McKay, 
Burton, & Thurman, where at least the first three named made verbal statements to the 
press. [R. 2 1 12, 63, 183 1 12] 
71 Besides inviting local Utah news media, Defendants invited the Associated 
Press (AP), knowing the AP distributed news releases nationwide to thousands of media 
subscribers, with the intent and purpose to have Defendants' publications distributed at 
least nationally including within Utah and the surrounding states. [R. 2 ^ 13, 183 1 13] 
8f At the press conference, two documents were provided to members of the 
press, one o( which was the Barrett Complaint. As a result, Roe, Morris, Mark, and 
White were responsible for the publication of the Barrett Complaint and its contents to the 
press. [R. 63, 67-136, R. 183 1 14| 
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9. At the press conference, Mary Ann read the following statement, a written 
copy of which was also provided to the press conference attendees: 
My name is Mary Ann and I was raised in the Kingston Polygamist Family. 
I escaped when I was 16 years old. I am pursuing this lawsuit with the hope 
that other young girls and boys in the same position that I was in will see 
that the leaders of the Kingston organization are not above the law, even 
though they tell us that they are, that the can be punished for what they do 
to us and that we can escape and seek recovery for the harm that was done 
to us. I also hope that the people that we are bringing this lawsuit against 
will realize the harm they have caused and continue to cause, and that they 
will change their ways. 
[R. 64, 138, 186] 
10. One of the news reports of the press conference stated: [R. 185 1 18(b)] 
A former underage "wife" who was severely beaten after trying to 
escape the polygamous Kingston clan has struck back with a $110 
million civil lawsuit against 242 family members and 97 businesses. 
Mary Ann Kingston, now 22, has sued 242 specifically identified 
members of "the Kingston family" and targeted assets of family-
owned firms. 
Her lawyers contend these [specifically identified 242 individuals 
including the Pratts] either directly contributed to physical and sexual 
abuse Roe suffered a few years ago or knew of the situation and did 
noting to prevent or report it. 
"She hopes to see civil justice punish the people who harmed her," 
said attorney Douglas White He added that Mary Ann Kingston also 
wanted to see an end to the "psychological, emotional and sexual 
exploitation of young girls" that she maintains permeates the 
philosophy of the [cooperative] ..." 
11. Morris told the media, "there are plenty of others who knew about this ... 
This is an attempt to punish the entire family ..." [R. 186 t 18®] 
12. William Mark told the media the individuals identified by name in the Barrett 
Complaint, which included the Pratts by name, are "the key members of the Kingston 
organization," and that Defendants were trying to "punish" them and "make an example 
of them." [R. 186 1 18(d)] 
13. Defendants intended that the media would inform the general public that the 
Barrett Complaint was a public record, making the general public, who would otherwise 
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have been ignorant of the document, aware of its ready availability. The media so 
informed the general public as Defendants intended. [R. 186 f 20] 
14. Defendants wilfully, purposefully, and intentionally caused their publications 
to be distributed both in print and orally in a media market as broad as possible, and in 
furtherance thereof succeeded in having their publications distributed in scores of media, 
making Defendants' publications national and international in scope. [R. 187-189] 
15. Some of the internet republications are available on-line to this day, making 
the republications continuous and ongoing. [R. 189 t 24] 
16. Defendants' press conference was the intended, direct and proximate cause 
of the media distributing their publications. As a result, Defendants caused and 
encouraged their publications to be distributed to scores of news sources and millions of 
persons, with a conscious purpose and goal to inflict injury on the Pratts, or in reckless 
disregard of the consequences of their actions to the Pratts. [t 25] 
17. Defendants intended that each recipient of Defendants' publications would 
conclude from those publications that the persons against whom the publications were 
directed, specifically including the Pratts, consider themselves above the law, promoted 
sexual, physical, and emotional abuse of Roe. Each recipient was reasonably likely to 
reach the conclusions intended by Defendants. [R. 189 ^ 26] 
18. Defendants' publications were made in a gratuitous press conference or in 
other times and places to persons having no connection to any judicial proceeding, 
extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving the publications, 
were published to more persons than the scope of the judicial privilege requires to 
effectuate its purpose, were published to more persons than necessary to resolve any legal 
dispute or further the objectives of any pending or proposed litigation, were published to 
persons who did not have a legitimate role in resolving any dispute, and were published 
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to persons who did not have an adequate legal interest in the outcome of any pending or 
proposed litigation. [R. 189 1 28] 
19. The defendants' publications alleged criminal conduct on the part of the 
Pratts, and/or imputed to the Pratts conduct which is incongruous with the exercise of a 
lawful business, trade, profession, or office. [R. 190 1 29] 
20. Defendants' publications as to the Pratts were false and with malice. [R. 190 
130] 
21. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, the Pratts have suffered 
injury including but not limited to damage to reputation and emotional suffering and 
distress. The Pratts' injuries are continuing and ongoing. [R. 190 1 32] 
22. Defendants intentionally or recklessly intruded on the Pratts' seclusion, 
solitude, and private affairs in a manner which would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and caused publicity without privilege, despite the lack of a legitimate public 
concern with the matters disclosed, through disclosure of private facts considered highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, which placed the Pratts in a false light in the public eye, 
subjecting the Pratts to opprobrium, contempt, reproach, embarrassment, and emotional 
distress. [R. 190-191 1 36] 
23. Defendants collectively comprise a combination of two or more persons, 
which operated with a meeting of minds to accomplish the unlawful objects alleged in the 
Pratts' Amended Complaint. [R. 191 K 42] 
24. One or more of Defendants committed overt acts directed against the Pratts 
in furtherance of the combination and conspiracy, resulting in injury to the Pratts. [R. 191 
143] 
25. The Pratts incorporate by reference II the "Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition at Trial Court," supra. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendants caused a Complaint to be filed that contained matters defaming the 
Pratts. A month later, Defendants held a press conference attended by the news media 
where Defendants distributed copies of their Complaint and made verbal statements 
defamatory of the defendants named in the Complaint. The media then publicized matters 
Defendants published to them at the press conference. While the filing of the Complaint 
was privileged, Defendants' distribution of the Complaint was not. Defendants forfeited 
the judicial proceeding privilege by excessive publication of the complaint outside the 
judicial arena to persons having no connection with the legal proceeding. 
The Pratts sued Defendants for defamation among other claims. The Defendants 
moved to dismiss the Pratts' lawsuit. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss by an 
erroneously holding the judicial proceeding privilege applied to Defendants' distribution 
of the Complaint at the press conference. The Court of Appeals affirmed by erroneously 
invoking the invited error rule. First, The Court of Appeals erred by raising that issue sua 
sponte. Second, the Pratts did not mislead the trial court to preserve a hidden ground for 
reversal on appeal. They asked the trial court to address their legal arguments on the 
judicial proceeding privilege. They opposed Defendants' motion to strike the Pratts' 
arguments. The trial court had the opportunity to address the Pratts' judicial proceeding 
privilege arguments but consciously chose not to. That was not invited error. 
The trial court held, and the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed, that 
Defendants' verbal defamations at the press conference, which did not expressly refer to 
the Pratts by name, as a matter of law could be found by any reasonable person to refer 
to the Pratts without looking at the Complaint, and impliedly ruled the Complaint, because 
privileged, could not be used to show Defendants' defamations referred to the Pratts, so 
that the "group defamation" rule barred the Pratts' defamation action. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISMISSAL BASED ON THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
PRIVILEGE. 
Defendants brought a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which was converted at least 
in part to one for summary judgment when with Defendants' reply memorandum they 
offered the Barrett Complaint. Applying the standard for review, see page 1 supra, the 
trial court erred in dismissing the Pratts' Complaint in this action, and the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming that dismissal based on the judicial proceeding privilege. 
A. Defendants Lost any Judicial Proceeding Privilege Through Excessive 
Publication of the Barrett Complaint. 
Defendants held a gratuitous press conference, at which they distributed to the 
attending news media copies of the Barrett Complaint, then made verbal statements relating 
to that litigation. 2 Publications at a press conference, even of matters otherwise 
privileged, are not protected by the judicial proceeding privilege. 
No Utah case has extended the judicial proceeding privilege to statements in a 
gratuitous press conference, or indeed to defamations made out of court in any context to 
persons with no connection to a judicial proceeding. Utah law is to the contrary. "The 
2
 The Pratts did not have a transcript of the press conference when preparing their 
Complaint or their memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. However, 
paragraph 17 of their Amended Complaint alleges, "In the press conference, in addition to 
distributing the document libeling the Pratts, Defendants slandered the Pratts by verbally stating 
to the media that specific persons including the Pratts had engaged in and/or promoted criminal 
conduct directed against Roe personally, and that through such criminal conduct the Pratts had 
injured Roe, and that the same specific persons including the Pratts considered themselves above 
the law, and had engaged in conduct toward Roe so egregious that they should be liable to her for 
over $110 million." Paragraph 27 alleges, "On information and belief, at other times and places 
Defendants, and one or more of the Doe defendants, have published other defamatory 
communications regarding the Pratts as will be shown through discovery." 
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class of occasions where the publication of defamatory matter is absolutely privileged is 
confined within narrow limits to cases in which the public service or the administration of 
justice requires complete immunity to account for language used." Allen v. Ortez, 802 
P.2d 1307, 1311/h.7 (Utah 1990). Defamation in a press conference is not within those 
narrow limits. Neither public service, the administration of justice, nor the public policy 
grounds for the "judicial proceeding" privilege, are served by immunizing tortfeasors to 
defame others in a press conference wholly outside the judicial arena. 
Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28 1 15, 20 P.3d 895 outlined the "excessive 
publication" limit on the "judicial proceeding" privilege: 
the judicial proceeding privilege may be lost due to excessive 
publication. See, e.g., DeBry, 1999 UT 111 at 11 21-24, 992 P.2d 979. 
Statements that are otherwise privileged lose their privilege if they are 
excessively published, that is, "published to more persons than the scope of 
the privilege requires to effectuate its purpose." Id. at 1 21 (citing Brehany 
v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) (stating that a privilege may be 
abused through publication to persons "beyond those who ha[ve] a legally 
justified reason for receiving it")). ... The excessive publication rule, in the 
context of judicial proceeding privilege cases, is to prevent abuse of the 
privilege by publication of defamatory statements to persons who have no 
connection to the judicial proceeding. DeBry, 1999 UT 111 at 1 21, 992 
P.2d 979. Therefore, ... the [publication] would be excessively published if 
it was published to more persons than necessary to resolve the dispute or 
further the objectives of the proposed litigation, in other words, if the letter 
was published to those who did not have a legitimate role in resolving the 
dispute, or if it was published to persons who did not have an adequate legal 
interest in the outcome of the proposed litigation. 
Defendants' publications to the media at Defendants' press conference was a 
publication to more persons than the scope of the privilege requires to effectuate its 
purpose. It was a publication beyond those who have a legally justified reason for 
receiving it. It was to persons who have no connection to the judicial proceeding. It was 
to more persons than necessary to resolve the dispute. It was to more persons than 
necessary to further the objectives of the litigation. It was to those who did not have a 
legitimate role in resolving the dispute. It was to persons who did not have an adequate 
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legal interest in the outcome of the proposed litigation. Under Krouse, every publication 
at the press conference was not privileged. 
It is the general rule that an attorney's publications to the press are not privileged. 
Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 114, 820 (5th ed 1984) ("[Statements given 
to the newspapers concerning the case are not part of a judicial proceeding, and are not 
absolutely privileged"); Prosser, Law of Torts § 114 (4th ed. 1971) ("It is clear ... that 
statements given to the newspapers concerning the case are no part of a judicial 
proceeding, and are not absolutely privileged."). 
The United States Supreme Court agrees with Krouse v. Bower and the general 
rule. In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), during a pending criminal action 
the prosecuting attorney held a press conference to publicize the case, and defamed 
Buckley to the attendees. The charges were dropped, and Buckley sued Fitzsimmons. The 
United States Supreme Court flatly rejected Fitzsimmon's argument that his publications 
at the press conference were privileged: 
Fitzsimmons' statements to the media are not entitled to absolute 
immunity ... Indeed, while prosecutors, like all attorneys, were entitled to 
absolute immunity from defamation liability for statements made during the 
course of judicial proceedings and relevant to them, most statements made 
out of court received only good faith immunity. The common law rule was 
that 'Tflhe speech of a counsel is privileged by the occasion on which it is 
spoken ..." 
Comments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial process 
just because they are made by a prosecutor. At the press conference, 
Fitzsimmons did not act in '"his role as advocate for the State.'" The 
conduct of a press conference does not involve the initiation of a 
prosecution, the presentation of the state's case in court, or actions 
preparatory for these functions. ... 
Id. at277 (emphasis added). The Buckley further observed (at/fl. 8, citations omitted): 
"[Absolute immunity] does not apply to or include ... any publication of 
defamatory matter to any person other than those to whom, or in any place 
other than that in which, such publication is required or authorized by law 
to be made for the proper conduct of the judicial proceedings." 
14 
Buckley holds that publications at a press conference about a pending judicial 
proceeding are not made "during the course of judicial proceedings," and are not subject 
to a judicial proceeding privilege. Defendants' press conference had no functional tie to 
the judicial process. Buckley supports this Court's holding in Allen that the judicial 
proceeding privilege is "confined within narrow limits to cases in which the public service 
or the administration of justice requires complete immunity." It is in accord with this 
Court's holding in Krouse that any privilege is lost if an attorney publishes "to more 
persons than the scope of the privilege requires to effectuate its purpose." 
Green Acres Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617 (Ariz. 1984) provides a well reasoned 
analysis of the excessive publication rule, London and other attorneys met to review a draft 
of a complaint. One of the lawyers invited a reporter and gave him a copy of the draft 
complaint. The reporter then wrote an article reporting on the grounds for the suit. Green 
Acres sued the attorneys for defamation. The trial court granted the attorneys summary 
judgment based on the judicial proceeding privilege. The Arizona Supreme Court 
reversed, Id. at 622-623, holding the privilege did not apply: 
[Ojther authorities have considered the "press conference" context and 
decided against the application of the privilege to communications made in 
that setting, [citations omitted] These authorities generally conclude that 
since publication to the news media lacks a sufficient relationship to judicial 
proceedings, it should not be protected by an absolute privilege. See Asay 
v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., supra, 594 F.2d at 697. ... 
Asay concluded that the application of the absolute privilege defense was 
dependent upon an analysis of the occasion for the communication and the 
substance of the communication. Id. 594 F.2d at 697. Focusing on the 
occasion of the statements, the/Ira)' court concluded that since " [publication 
to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial 
proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion," the absolute privilege should 
not immunize such publication to the media. Id. The court found that this 
conclusion harmonized with the public policy underlying the privilege: 
The salutary policy of allowing freedom of communication in 
judicial proceedings does not warrant or countenance the 
dissemination and distribution of defamatory accusations 
outside of the judicial proceeding. No public purpose is served 
by allowing a person to unqualifiedly make libelous or 
defamatory statements about another, but rather such person 
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should be called upon to prove the correctness of his 
allegations or respond in damages. 
Id. at 698. We conclude that the Asay ruling represents the better position 
considering the competing interests to be protected. We believe that both 
content and manner of extra-judicial communications must bear "some 
relation to the proceeding." The requirements of Asay that the recipient of 
the extra-judicial communication have some relationship to the proposed or 
pending judicial proceeding for the occasion to be privileged is sound, 
[citations omitted] 
In this case, the recipient of the communications, the newspaper 
reporter, had no relation to the proposed class action. The reporter played 
no role in the actual litigation other than that of a concerned observer. Since 
the reporter lacked a sufficient connection to the proposed proceedings, 
public policy would be ill served if we immunized the communications made 
to the reporter by the lawyer defendants. The press conference simply did 
not enhance the judicial function and no privileged occasion arose. 
Accordingly, the lawyer defendants were not absolutely privileged to publish 
the oral and written communications to the newspaper reporter. 
See Kennedy v. Zimmermann, 601 N.W.2d 61, 65-66 (Iowa 1999), (attorney 
interviews with news reporters, including the republication of statements made in an 
otherwise privileged court paper, are not privileged: "We recognize statements contained 
in a petition to a lawsuit are absolutely privileged. However, republication outside a 
judicial proceeding of protected communications previously made in a judicial proceeding 
is not privileged."); Barto v. Felix, 378 A.2d 927, 230 (Penn. 1977), quoting Doe v. 
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314 n. 8 (1973) ("The republication of a libel, in circumstances 
where the initial publication is privileged, is generally unprotected."). 
The press did not discover the Barrett Complaint on their own. Defendants 
provided it to them, and in doing so stripped the Barrett Complaint of any judicial 
proceeding privilege or other privilege. The media's reporting of the lawsuit is subject to 
a more limited "fair reporting" privilege. Even that privilege is not available to 
Defendants. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611, comment c: "A person cannot 
confer this privilege [a more limited "fair report" privilege] upon himself by making the 
original defamatory publication himself and then reporting to other people what he had 
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stated. This is true whether the original publication was privileged or not." In Williams 
v. Williams, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. 1969), the defendants sued the plaintiff for civil 
conspiracy, then publicly circulated copies of the complaint. When sued in return for 
republishing the contents of their complaint, the defendants asserted a "fair report" 
privilege. The court denied their motion to dismiss, holding the "fair report" privilege 
does not permit a person to file a defamatory pleading, republish it to persons not involved 
in the court proceeding, and then escape liability by invoking the privilege. 
The Barrett Complaint was filed on August 1, 2003. Defendants held their press 
conference on August 28, 2003. There is no evidence any member of the media ever 
obtained a copy of the Complaint from any place other than from Defendants at the press 
conference. It is a reasonable inference from the facts of this case, which this court must 
accept as true, that but for Defendants' affirmative acts, the news media would not have 
discovered Mary Ann's Complaint, that there would have been no publication of any 
statement by Defendants outside the walls of the Matheson Courthouse, and that any harm 
to the Pratts was directly and proximately caused by Defendants' press conference. 
If Defendants had their way, anyone wanting to commit defamation with impunity 
could simply incorporate his defamations in a Complaint, file it with a court, and republish 
to his heart's content. The law simply does not immunize tortfeasors from liability to 
incorporate defamations in a court pleading, call a press conference to self-republish their 
defamations outside the privileged judicial arena to persons unconnected to any court 
proceeding, and then claim a judicial proceeding privilege (or any other privilege) for their 
extra-judicial publications. Defendants' statements to the press were excessive publications 
outside the judicial arena, to persons not involved in the judicial proceeding, and were not 
privileged. This is not to say Defendants cannot hold a press conference. But if they do, 
they publish at their own risk, and have no judicial proceeding immunity for any excessive 
publications. 
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The Trial Court committed reversible error by holding the judicial proceeding 
privilege immunized Defendants from tort liability for distributing the Barrett Complaint 
at their press conference. The Court of Appeals concluded at 2005 UT App 541 ^[15, 
"Given what was before the [trial] court, this ruling [applying the judicial proceeding 
privilege] appears to be entirely correct." That statement was reversible error. The trial 
court was obligated to take as true all factual allegations of the Pratt's Amended Complaint 
not specifically contradicted by matters Defendants offered outside the pleadings. The 
Amended Complaint alleges Defendants' publications were to members of the news media 
at a press conference, and (a) were not made during or in the course of a judicial 
proceeding; (b) were not confined within narrow limits to cases in which the public 
service or the administration of justice requires immunity; ® were made in a gratuitous 
press conference to persons having no connection to any judicial proceeding; (d) extended 
beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving the publications; (e) were 
published to more persons than the scope of the judicial proceeding privilege requires to 
effectuate its purpose; (f) were published to more persons than necessary to resolve any 
legal dispute or further the objectives of any pending or proposed litigation; (g) were 
published to persons who did not have a legitimate role in resolving any dispute; and (h) 
were published to persons who did not have an adequate legal interest in the outcome of 
any pending or proposed litigation. See also Facts Nos. 5 and 8 supra. Next, the law that 
Defendants themselves presented to the trial court included Beezley v. Hansen, 286 P.2d 
1057, 1058 (UT 1955) [R146]: 
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory 
matter of another ... during the course and as part of a judicial proceeding 
in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto. 
Based on the facts before the trial court, Defendants' publications were not during the 
course and as part of a judicial proceeding in which they participated as counsel. 
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Defendants next referred the trial court to Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 
(UT 1997). That citation states: 
Three elements must be satisfied for allegedly defamatory statements to 
qualify for an absolute privilege: (1) The statement must have been made 
during or in the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) the statement must have 
some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding; and (3) the statement 
must have been made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror, 
witness, litigant, or counsel. 
Applying the standard of review, supra, neither the Trial Court nor the Court of 
Appeals could correctly conclude as a matter of law that Defendants' publications at their 
press conference, including their republication of the Barrett Complaint were made during 
or in the course of a judicial proceeding by someone acting in the capacity of witness, 
litigant or counsel. 
Defendants next referred the trial court to Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1311 (UT 
1990). That citation states at footnote 7 (quoting Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S. W. 2d 635, 640 
(Mo. 1966) (quoting 53 C.J.S. Libel & Slander § 102 (currently § 69 (1987))): 
The class of occasions where the publication of defamatory matter is 
absolutely privileged is confined within narrow limits to cases in which the 
public service or the administration of justice requires complete immunity to 
account for language used. 
Again applying the standard of review for this action, the facts and inferences 
construed in favor of the Pratts did not permit either the Trial Court or the Court of 
Appeals to conclude Defendants' press conference fell "within narrow limits to cases in 
which the public service or the administration of justice requires complete immunity." 
Beezley was not authority for granting Defendants a dismissal as a matter of law. 
Beezley held an attorney's statements to his client in the course of litigation, relating to the 
matter in litigation, were privileged, but also recognized "the conduct of the litigation 
includes the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, comments upon the evidence 
and arguments both oral and written upon the evidence, whether made to the court or 
jury." Id. Defendants' press conference included none of those things. In Price, the 
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allegedly defamatory statements were made in connection with a pending National Labor 
Relations Board proceedings, referred to the NLRB case, and dealt with a proposed 
settlement of the case. Here, Defendants' publications were made in a forum unrelated to 
their legal proceeding. In Allen, a divorced mother filed a petition to modify her custody 
and visitation rights. At the request of the father, a clinical social worker who had 
examined the child sent a letter to the domestic relations commissioner before whom the 
petition was pending, stating the mother and stepfather had abused the child. The trial 
court dismissed a resulting defamation suit by the mother based on the judicial proceeding 
privilege. This Court reversed, holding as a matter of law that the social worker, while 
a potential witness in the custody proceeding, was not acting as a witness when she sent 
the letter, and therefore the privilege did not apply. Applying Defendants' own legal 
authorities to the facts of this case, the publications of which the Pratts complain were not 
made "during the course and as part of a judicial proceeding." They were made at a 
gratuitous press conference having no relation to a judicial proceeding. Also, while 
Defendants were a litigant and counsel in pending litigation, they were not acting in those 
capacities at the specific time when they were making their publications at the press 
conference. Even without the Pratts' supplemental memorandum on the judicial 
proceeding privilege, the Court of Appeal's conclusion is incorrect based on the facts and 
law before the trial court. 
Defendants argue the news media has "a connection to the case" in that the media 
is involved in publishing stories that are newsworthy, and that Mary Ann's case was 
newsworthy. Defendants cite no authority for their contention, because there is none. 
Allen, one of the very cases Defendants argued to the trial court, is to the contrary. 
A newsworthy story does not make an attorney's active participation in spreading 
lies to the press privileged. The scope of a judicial proceeding privilege is not determined 
by whether a publication is newsworthy. The privilege does not apply to publications 
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made to persons who are not necessary to resolve the dispute or who lack a legal interest 
in the outcome of the litigation. Krouse at 1 15. A newsworthy story does not make the 
press necessary to resolve a lawsuit. A newsworthy story does not give the press a legal 
interest in the outcome of a lawsuit between private parties. No matter how newsworthy 
a story, the news media are not necessary to resolve private lawsuits and have no legal 
interest in the outcome of private lawsuits. An attorney's statement is "privileged by the 
occasion on which it is spoken," and is not privileged if made to "any person other than 
those to whom, or in any place other than that in which, such publication is required or 
authorized by law to be made for the proper conduct of the judicial proceedings." Buckley 
at 277 and fn 8. The news media are not persons to whom publications are required or 
authorized for the proper conduct of a judicial proceeding. 
Defendants' publication of the Barrett Complaint was an excessive publication that 
under controlling Utah law stripped it of any judicial proceeding privilege. The trial court 
erred by applying the judicial proceeding privilege. The Court of Appeals erred by 
refusing to reverse that decision. 
B, The Appellate Court Erred in applying the "Invited Error Doctrine Sua 
Sponte. 
In State v. King, 2006 UT 3 V^fn 2, 131 P.3d 202 (citations omitted) this Court 
applied the rule it adopted in State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106, that the appellate 
courts of this State will not apply the invited error doctrine sua sponte: 
Although we recognize that King affirmatively represented to the trial court 
that he did not have an objection to the two jurors he now challenges on 
appeal, thereby implicating the invited error doctrine, we decline to apply 
that doctrine in this case because the State failed to raise it in its brief. See 
State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 1 39 n. 10, 82 P.3d 1106 (noting that while the 
invited error doctrine "may preclude application of the plain error analysis," 
the court will refuse to consider it when "neither party raised this question 
below or in their briefs or at oral argument") ... 
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State v. Casey was controlling precedent when the Court of Appeals entered its 
decision in this case. The parties to this action did not invoke the invited error doctrine 
before the trial court, and did not raise the question in their briefs or oral argument before 
the Court of Appeals. The first, and only time, the issue was raised was in the Court of 
Appeals' Opinion. [Record generally]. Under the rule stated in State v. King and State 
v. Casey, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the invited error doctrine sua sponte. 
C. The Pratts Did Not Invite Error. 
The invited error doctrine is a rule of limited applicability. Normally, "in order to 
preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that 
the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48 1 14, 48 P.3d 968. There is a "plain error" exception to this 
rule. "The plain error test has three parts: the demonstration of error; a qualitative 
showing that the error was plain, manifest, or obvious to the trial court; and evidence that 
the error affected the substantial rights of a party." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81 161, 
130 P.3d 325. 
The invited error doctrine is an exception to the "plain error" exception. See State 
v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4 1114-15 , 128 P.3d 1171 (citations omitted): 
[U]nder the doctrine of invited error, we have declined to engage in even 
plain error review when "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no objection to the 
[proceedings]." 
Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that " 'a party 
cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the 
trial court into committing the error.' " By precluding appellate review, the 
doctrine furthers this principle by "discouraging] parties from intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on 
appeal." Encouraging counsel to actively participate in all proceedings and 
to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence " 'fortifies our 
long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity 
to address a claim of error.' " 
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A review of the proceedings proves the Pratts did not invite error. Defendants 
responded to the Pratts' Complaint with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In their reply 
memorandum, Defendants raised a judicial privilege argument. The trial court authorized 
the Pratts to file a supplemental memorandum addressing that issue. The Pratts filed their 
supplemental memorandum. Defendants filed a motion to strike the Pratts' supplemental 
memorandum, on the sole ground it had been filed late. Defendants submitted their motion 
to dismiss for decision the same day. The Pratts filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Defendants' motion to strike, together with a motion to strike the judicial proceeding 
privilege argument in Defendants' reply memorandum. Defendants did not oppose the 
Pratts' motion to strike, did not file a reply memorandum in support of their own motion 
to strike, and did not submit their motion to strike for decision. The Trial Court then 
entered its Ruling on all pending motions. 
In State v. Perm, 2004 UT App 212 ^23, 94 P.3d 308, the state argued the 
defendant had invited error by failing to object to a jury instruction. The Court disagreed: 
While the State is correct that Mr. Skordas initially seemed to agree with the 
instruction language, his subsequent actions clearly reflect that it was only 
a tentative agreement. This was confirmed the next day when he asked the 
trial court to remove the last sentence of the instruction. By asking for this 
change, we cannot say that Penn "led the trial court into committing the 
error" which he now appeals. Therefore, we reject the State's argument that 
Penn invited the alleged error he is now challenging. 
The Pratts did not seek to take advantage of a plain error which they led the trial 
court into committing. The Pratts did not intentionally mislead the trial court so as to 
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal. The Pratts affirmatively asked the trial 
court to address their legal arguments on the judicial proceeding privilege. They even 
opposed Defendants' motion to strike the Pratts' arguments, a motion that was never 
submitted for decision. The trial court had the first opportunity to address the Pratts' 
judicial proceeding privilege arguments but consciously chose not to. In other words, the 
Pratts did not invite the trial court's error. 
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The Pratts did not set the trial court up to rule erroneously on the scope of the 
judicial proceeding privilege. The Pratts' only error was in the timing of their 
Supplemental Memorandum, which although late was filed before Defendants submitted 
their Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment for decision. Therefore, the Pratts' legal 
authorities were available to the trial court before Defendants' motion was ready for 
decision. See Utah R. Civ. Proc. 7(d): "When briefing is complete, either party may file 
a 'Request to Submit for Decision.' ... If no party files a request, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision." The fact that the Pratts had filed a supplemental memorandum 
gave the trial court notice there were arguments to be made, supported by precedential 
legal authority, that the judicial proceeding privilege did not apply. Trial courts routinely 
hear oral argument on dispositive motions. Judge Allphin could have held a hearing, 
during which the Pratts would have argued those authorities even in the absence of their 
supplemental memorandum. 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 7(c)(1) allows, in connection with a motion, a supporting 
memorandum, a memorandum in opposition, and a reply memorandum, "which shall be 
limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition." No other 
memoranda are to be considered without leave of court. The trial court considered the 
Defendants' judicial proceeding privilege argument although it was raised in their reply 
memorandum as a matter that was not limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the Pratts' 
memorandum in opposition. The trial court then affirmatively refused to consider the 
Pratts' supplemental memorandum even though the trial court had authorized it, and it was 
filed before the trial court ruled on Defendants' motion to dismiss, solely because it was 
filed late. The trial court did so in the face of the parties' cross motions to strike their 
opponents' arguments on judicial proceeding privilege, before those motions were 
submitted for decision. The Pratts contend that, while the trial court has discretion in such 
matters, for the trial court, in the face of the Pratt's objection, wilfully to ignore one side 
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of a legal argument presented on a dispositive issue, is an abuse of that discretion. 
Whether or not it was an abuse of discretion, however, it is clear that the Pratts did not 
invite the error. 
Judge Allphin deliberately chose to ignore, or remain ignorant of, legal authorities 
on the judicial proceeding privilege issue that he knew existed and that the Pratts had 
provided him and asked him to consider. That is not invited error. The Court of Appeals 
committed reversible error by saying it was. 
II. Defendants' Publications Were Not Protected by a "Group Defamation" Rule, 
The Pratts alleged three categories of defamations: Defendants' republication of the 
Barrett Complaint at their press conference, which specifically refers to the Pratts by 
name; Defendants' verbal statements to the press conference attendees, referencing the 
Barrett Complaint; and the press and broadcast media's republication of Defendants' 
statements, again referencing the Barrett Complaint. The Court of Appeals erred by 
affirming the trial court's dismissal of those claims under the "group defamation" rule. 
A. The Barrett Complaint Identified the Pratts by Name. 
The Barrett Complaint, which Defendants republished by distributing it at their 
press conference, identifies Nevin Pratt and Denise Pratt by name. If the Barrett 
Complaint did not refer to and concern the Pratts, under Utah R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) it 
would also fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against the Pratts. The 
"group defamation" rule simply does not apply to a defamation where a person is 
identified by name, even if he is ont of others also identified by name. Such a publication 
is not a "group defamation" at all - it is specific defamations of specific individuals, 
however many. 
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If a person held up a legal directory of Utah's attorneys and announced all lawyers 
are shysters, it might be a group defamation, not actionable by any of them. But if that 
person took pen in hand, and using his own recollection singled out a hundred attorneys 
with whom he claimed personal dealings, and falsely said those specific attorneys had 
gathered together and physically assaulted him, his statement would be outside the group 
defamation rule, and actionable by each of the lawyers he had defamed. In the Barrett 
Complaint, Mary Ann used her own recollection and wrote down the names of specific 
persons with whom she claimed personal dealings, singling out and including Nevin Pratt 
and Denise Pratt by name, and falsely said the Pratts had personally committed specific 
torts against her personally. Where as here a publication singles out and identifies people 
by name, whether it is three names or three hundred, it directly refers to and concerns the 
persons named, and the so-called "group defamation" rule does not apply 
B. Any "Group Defamations" Referred to and Concerned the Pratts. 
Where the Barrett Complaint singles out and identifies people by name, it directly 
refers to and concerns those people. Defendants' other publications, by referencing the 
Barrett Complaint, necessarily also refer to and concerns the same people including Nevin 
and Denise Pratt, so the "group defamation" rule also does not apply to those publications 
either. Lynch v. Standard Pub. Co., 170 P. 770, 773 (Utah 1918), while over 80 years 
old, is this Court's most recent case addressing the "group defamation rule": 
[W]here words defamatory in their character seem to apply to a particular 
class of individuals, and are not specifically defamatory of any particular 
member of the class, an action can be maintained by any individual of the 
class who may be able to show the words referred to himself. 
Dismissal is proper only where it is clear that the Pratts would not be entitled to 
relief under any state of facts they could prove to support their claim. One "state of facts" 
the Pratts could prove might be that statements such as the following were made at the 
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press conference. 3 One state of facts the Pratts could prove is that Douglas White might 
have said something like, "Mary Ann Kingston ... hopes to see civil justice punish and 
make an example of the people who harmed her, sending an unequivocal message to those 
people." 
Tohn Morris and the news media might have had a dialog something like this: 
REPORTER SIX [examining the Barrett Complaint].... I don't know, say, 
luth Davis. You've got her listed here. ... So, say, you think it's fair that 
Ann Kelly or Ruth Davis be bankrupt, no matter what their personal actions 
may have been? 
MR. MORRIS: Well, let me explain why that's the case ... The lady you 
mentioned probably has no checking account, no savings account, owns no 
property. There would be no reason for her to declare bankruptcy, because 
individually there would be no way for us to collect against her. 
REPORTER SEVEN: I have not read this [Third District Court Complaint 
given him/her by Defendants] carefully, but as near as I can tell, there just 
is zero evidence in here the AAA ... or Melanie Finley are in any way 
involved in any of this wrongdoing. Do you actually - are you going to tell 
us if you actually have some evidence ... ? 
MR. MORRIS: ... I can tell you this. Every allegation in that complaint 
is supported by evidence that we have obtained in our investigation. 
REPORTER SEVEN [looking at the Third District Court Complaint given 
him/her by Defendants]: ... Do you have evidence that Anna Jenkins 
actually did something wrong, or did you just get her name somewhere and 
throw it in? 
MR. MORRIS: Initially, once again, the complaint is not a place to present 
evidence. ... 
REPORTER SEVEN: Do you have any evidence against Anna Jenkins? 
MR. MORRIS: Yes, we do have evidence supporting the reasons for which 
Anna Jenkins is listed in that lawsuit. ... 
REPORTER SEVEN: What exactly in the case of Anna Jenkins did she do? 
MR. MORRIS: I can't tell you -
These statements, presented here as a hypothetical state of facts the Pratts could prove 
to support their claims, are actually verbatim excerpts from a transcript of the press 
conference, unfortunately obtained by counsel too late to include in the trial court record. 
27 
REPORTER SEVEN: Do you actually know something? 
MR. MORRIS: - for each specific person as we sit here ... 
A statement such as the last one would show that Defendants directed and intended 
their statements to refer to and concern, not some amorphous unidentifiable group, but 
"each specific person" identified by name in the Third District Court Complaint. A jury 
could find that taken as a whole from a state of facts like these that Defendants intended 
their statements to relate to and concern "each specific person" named as a defendant in 
the Third District Court Complaint, which includes the Pratts. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Pratts could not, without relying on the Barrett 
Complaint, show Defendants' other statements referred to the Pratts. But neither the trial court 
nor the Court of Appeals offered any explanation why the Pratts should not be able to rely 
on the Barrett Complaint to show Defendants's words at the press conference, even words 
describing a group, referred to the Pratts. Under the standard of review stated at page 1 
supra, the law is to the contrary. The Lynch rule says it is reversible error to dismiss the 
Pratt's claims if the Pratts may be able to show Defendants referred to the Pratts at the 
press conference. There is no limitation on what evidence can be used to make that 
showing. Even if distribution of the Barrett Complaint at the press conference was not an 
excessive publication (it was) and was privileged (it was not), that point is irrelevant to 
whether the Pratts can use the Barrett Complaint as evidence of what persons Defendants 
were talking about at their press conference. 
The general rule espoused in Lynch was earlier adopted in Fenstermaker v. Tribune 
Pub. Co., 43 P. 112 (Utah Terr. 1895) (Fenstermaker I): 
Where the words used seem to apply only to a class of individuals, and not 
to be specially defamatory of any particular member of that class, still the 
action can be maintained by any individual of that class who can satisfy the 
jury that the words referred especially to himself. ... [WJhere the words, 
by any reasonable application, impute a charge to several individuals, under 
some general description or general name, either one coming within such 
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description may successfully maintain an action, if the jury determine that 
the words have a personal application to the person bringing suit. 
Fenstermaker I says that whether a "group defamation" refers especially to an individual, 
or has personal application to an individual, is a question of fact for the jury. 
Utah was admitted as a state, and its Constitution came into force, on January 4, 
1896, immediately following Fenstermaker I. The Utah Constitution, Article 1 § 11, 
states: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial ..." Shortly after Utah obtained statehood, this Court decided 
Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 45 P. 1097 (Utah 1896) (hereinafter Fenstermaker II), 
which held: 
One who publishes matter about a family in its collective capacity 
assumes the risk of its being libelous as to any member thereof. Any other 
rule would violate elementary principles of jurisprudence, in suffering a 
wrong to exist without a remedy, and would permit indiscriminating 
reference to the deeds of a single member of the family as the deeds of all 
collectively, while the odium should rest legally and morally only upon the 
member of the family who is guilty. 
The Fenstermaker cases should be read in harmony with the contemporaneously adopted 
Utah Constitution. One who publishes a matter about a group in its collective capacity 
assumes the risk of its being libelous as to any member thereof. Any other rule would 
violate elementary principles of jurisprudence, in suffering a wrong to exist without a 
remedy, and so would violate Utah's unique "open courts" state constitutional requirement 
that every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law. 
Defendants did not merely publish matters about a group in its collective capacity. 
They published a selective written list of specific persons naming the Pratts in particular, 
as to whom Defendants represented those specific persons were the particular ones against 
whom Defendants were directing their defamations. But even if the publications had been 
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limited to a group in its collective capacity (they were not), the Pratts still have causes of 
action under Utah law. Fenstermaker I says the Pratts have an action if they "can satisfy 
the jury that the words referred especially to himself." Fenstermaker II says Defendants 
assume the risk of group defamations being defamatory as to any member of a group. And 
Lynch says Defendants are liable for "group defamation" to any member of a group "who 
may be able to show the words referred to himself." 
Even if this Court adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts §564A as the Court of 
Appeals suggests, subpart (b) would apply: "One who publishes defamatory matter 
concerning a group or class of persons is subject to liability to an individual member of it 
if ... the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is 
particular reference to the member." 
The first "circumstance of publication" was Defendants' republication of Mary 
Ann's Complaint and its contents to the press conference attendees. That act was an 
extra-judicial republication by Defendants to the media of the statements summarized in 
Fact No. 5 supra. The Barrett Complaint names not some amorphous group, but rather 
names "individual defendants" including the Pratts. Defendants selectively identified the 
Pratts by name in the Barrett Complaint, hand-picking them from a larger group, as 
persons to whom their defamations referred. A carefully compiled list of named 
individuals does not identify a "group," it identifies the individuals. Defendants' 
statements in the Barrett Complaint clearly refer to and concern the Pratts. 
The second "circumstance of publication" is that Defendants' verbal publications 
to the news media at their press conference were made in the context of the attendees 
having copies of the Barrett Complaint in hand at that time Defendants made their verbal 
publications. After distributing the Barrett Complaint, Defendants spoke to the press 
conference attendee about that lawsuit, interchangeably using terms such as "the people 
that we are bringing this lawsuit against," "the people who harmed her," "the key 
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members of the Kingston organization." "the leaders of the Kingston organization," "the 
Kingston family," "they," and "them" to refer to the defendants named in the Barrett 
Complaint including the Pratts in particular. Defendants used terms such as "the Order" 
and "organization." A reasonable person could readily conclude - indeed, it was crystal 
clear from the context - that Defendants intended those terms to refer to and concern the 
persons singled out and named as Defendants in the Barrett Complaint, including Nevin 
Pratt and Denise Pratt. It is reasonable to infer that the news media concluded that 
Defendants' verbal publications were intended to, and did, refer to and concern the 
individuals identified by name in that document, including the Pratts. This is only 
common sense. See Cuthbert v. National Organization for Women, 615 N.Y.S.2d 534, 
536 (N. Y. A.D. 1994), in which the fact that defamatory material did not identify plaintiff 
a by name does not preclude his defamation suit. The plaintiff needed merely show the 
press conference referred to him, which he could do by showing members of the press 
were able to ascertain his identity through the records of a pending lawsuit. 
Even where the group defamation rule applies, there is no hard and fast "bright line" 
rule cutting off claims as a matter of law based on the size of the group defamed. In Fawcett 
Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962), a magazine publisher distributed an 
article falsely implying the University of Oklahoma football squad, some "sixty or seventy 
members," used drugs to enhance their performance. The court noted that "In Ortenberg v. 
Plcunondon et al. ..., a member of the Jewish race in Quebec, consisting of 75 families out 
of a total city population of 80,000 people, could maintain an action of defamation of the 
entire group even though he was not assailed individually, but only as a member of the 
group." id. at 51. Further, "the primary consideration would properly seem to be whether 
the plaintiff was in fact defamed, although not specifically designated. Considerations adduced 
in support of the absolute denial of recovery are inconclusive, as against the desirability of 
providing a remedy for actual injury. ... A more realistic approach would recognize that 
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even a general derogatory reference to a group does affect the reputation of every member, 
and would adopt as its test the intensity of the suspicion cast upon the plaintiff.'" Id. at 52 
(quoting 31 Columbia Law Review 1322, Liability for Defamation of a Group) The court 
held "the article libeled every member of the team, including the plaintiff, although he was 
not specifically named therein." 
In Brady v. Ottawav Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 234-235, 445 N.Y.S.2d 
786, (N.Y. App. 1981), which recognized a "group defamation" claim by at least fifty-
three individuals, the court said: 
In New York there has been no articulated limit on size and we decline the 
opportunity to suggest one. An absolute limit on size is not justifiable. There 
is no compelling logic "in allowing a greater number of wrongs to afford a 
lesser degree of liability" in group defamation actions. (Lewis, The 
Individual Member's Right to Recover for a Defamation Leveled at the 
Group, 17 U. Miami L. Q. 519, 535.) In Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. 475, a 
case in which the majority opinion has since fallen into disrepute (1 Seelman, 
Law of Libel & Slander in New York, pars. 98-100), the dissenting Justice 
Van Ness pointed out the inequitable and illogical results of applying the 
policy against a multiplicity of suits in actions of this type (p. 482): 
"I cannot assent to the idea, that the number of persons who 
may be libeled, affords the rule to determine whether or not an 
action will lie. Such a rule would be unjust and arbitrary. The 
libeller who calumniates a number of persons, by name, is 
liable to an action by each; and, in such a case, he would 
hardly be allowed to say, even in extenuation of his offence, 
much less in bar to the action, that, because he had exposed 
himself to so many actions, he ought not, therefore, to be 
punished at all. If such a rule should be adopted, the 
calumniator, who assails and reviles a great number of 
individuals in the same malicious publication, will escape; 
while the less guilty and less hardy slanderer, who has 
traduced the character of a single man only, shall be 
punished." 
In Hansen v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. App. 1981), the plaintiffs were among an 
unstated number of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents who responded to a 
tip of a drug drop-off at a remote airstrip. Stoll, who owned a nearby mine, saw what he 
thought was suspicious activity, and held the agents with a shotgun until the sheriff 
arrived. Stoll was convicted of assaulting a federal officer. He then accused a group he 
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described as "federal agents" of perjury and drug dealing. Some agents sued and won a 
judgment against Stoll for defamation. On appeal, the Court rejected Stoll's argument that 
his statements did not sufficiently identify specific persons, and so were not actionable. 
Stoll had referred to "federal agents," a group that likely numbered in hundreds if not 
thousands, only five of whom he ever identified by name, and that in only one of 
numerous defamatory communications. The court held the question was whether persons 
not identified by name could be connected to the defamatory remarks, and left it to the jury 
to make that connection based on the evidence at trial: "It is not necessary to prove that 
every reader could make the connection, as publication to any individual will suffice. ... 
The question of identification is for the jury to decide." Id. at 1241. 
Here, even if Defendants had not selectively named the Pratts in writing, it is for 
the jury to determine that the Pratts can be connected to Defendants' defamatory 
statements. Defendants established the connection themselves, by giving the witnesses of 
their defamations the Barrett Complaint, containing a written list identifying the Pratts by 
name as those to whom Defendants' defamatory publications applied, and referring back 
to the defendants in that lawsuit as those against whom they directed their publications. 
The policy behind the "group defamation" rule is not to bar multiple lawsuits by 
large numbers of defamed individuals. Such a policy would run directly afoul of Article 
I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which provides, "All courts shall be open, and 
every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial ..." The very 
idea that the more people injured, the less right they have to sue, is antithetical to this 
"open courts" provision. Rather, under Utah law the "group defamation" rule is a rule 
of reason, a common sense application of the concepts that a party claiming defamation 
must have been injured, and that publications not referring to anyone in particular have not 
injured anyone in particular. All "what if" scenarios are answered by this principal. For 
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example, if a person merely holds up a Utah Attorney Directory and says "all lawyers are 
shysters," his statement is not actionable. But if he opens the same book and, reading 
names from it, falsely says, "David Aagard assaulted me. Richard Aaron assaulted me. 
Charles Abbot assaulted me. Douglas Adair assaulted me. John Adams assaulted me. 
Robert Adler, John Alex, and Steven Allred assaulted me," and continues on in that "vein, 
identifying people by name and saying each one assaulted him, each one so named has 
been defamed, not as a group but as an individual. Each person so named has a cause of 
action, whether the tortfeasor called out three names, or thirty, or three hundred. This 
case is the second "what if." Defendants provided the press conference attendees with the 
Barrett Complaint, which makes specific defamations of the Pratts, and then made verbal 
publications showing they intended their statements to refer to each individual defendant 
including the Pratts. It is a question for the jury whether Defendants' words have a 
personal application to the Pratts. Even the Trial Court recognized this fact in its Ruling 
[R 245] when it admitted, "Our high court, however, also stated that where the words 
refer only to a class of individuals, yet can be interpreted as referring to an individual or 
limited individuals, that person or those persons can maintain an action for liable. This 
would seem to indicate a factual issue, improper for the Court to decide at this point." It 
was error to for the Trial Court to resolve that factual issue against the Pratts, and 
reversible error for the Court of Appeals to affirm it. 
For the same reasons, Defendants' publication of matters constituting an invasion 
of privacy also concern the Pratts. 
Utah law says any person who can satisfy a jury that a group defamation refers to 
himself has a cause of action. Defendants selectively identified and defamed the Pratts by 
name, in a manner allowing a jury to find their additional publications not identifying the 
Pratts by name also referred to and concerned them. The Trial Court, and later the Court 
of Appeals, committed reversible error by taking that issue from the jury. 
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CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the above, Nevin Pratt and Denise Pratt respectfully ask this Court to 
reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reverse the trial court's August 17, 2004 
Rulings on Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum, Ruling 
on Plaintiff Pratts' Motion to Strike Defendants' "Judicial Privilege" Argument, and 
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, hold that Defendants' press 
conference was not protected by judicial proceeding privilege, hold the Pratts' claims are 
not barred by the so-called group defamation rule, and remand this action for trial. 
DATED May 10, 2006. 
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ADDENDUM 
12/15/2005 Pratt v. Nelson. 2005 UT App 541. 
08/17/2004 Pratt v. Nelson, Trial Court's ruling on various motions including 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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ORME, Judge: 
Hi Nevin and Denise Pratt were named as defendants in a lawsuit 
against alleged members of a polygamous cult. Counsel for 
plaintiff in that case held a press conference about the lawsuit, 
out of which this defamation action arose. In this appeal, the 
Pratts seek to overturn a ruling on summary judgment dismissing 
their lawsuit with prejudice. Specifically, the Pratts appeal 
the trial court's application of the judicial proceeding 
privilege and group defamation doctrine to bar their claims. We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
512 On February 11, 2004, the Pratts brought claims of 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy against 
Defendants Mary Ann Nelson; Douglas F. White; John Dustin Morris; 
William A. Mark; and McKay, Burton & Thurman, P.C. (collectively 
"the Defendants") following a press conference the Defendants 
held and participated in on August 28, 2003. The press 
conference was characterized by the Defendants as a preemptive 
effort to address the likely media attention that Mary Ann 
Nelson's lawsuit against David and Daniel Kingston would garner: 
Nelson, with the assistance of her attorneys--the other 
defendants named by the Pratts--had filed a complaint against 
David Kingston, Daniel Kingston, and many others (the Kingston 
Complaint), seeking damages for various alleged batteries and 
other torts. At the press conference, Nelson and at least two of 
her attorneys made statements to the press concerning the 
Kingston Complaint and its allegations. The Defendants 
distributed copies of the Kingston Complaint to members of the 
press who were present and, upon the request of a reporter, 
provided copies of the statement that Nelson read at the press 
conference (Nelson's Press Statement).1 
%3 Of particular relevance to this case are the Kingston 
Complaint's claims of infliction of emotional distress, civil 
conspiracy, and negligence against over 200 individual 
defendants, including the Pratts. As to these defendants, the 
Kingston Complaint specifically alleged that as members of a 
secretive religious society and economic organization known as 
"the Order," the defendants assisted, encouraged, or knew of--and 
failed to prevent or report--the alleged torts committed by David 
and Daniel Kingston against Nelson. 
|^4 The Defendants responded to the Pratts' lawsuit by moving to 
dismiss it for failure to state a claim. The Pratts filed a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, and the 
1. Nelson's written statement reads: 
My name is Mary Ann and I was raised in the 
Kingston Polygamist Family. I escaped when I 
was 16 years old. I am pursuing this lawsuit 
with the hope that other young girls and boys 
in the same position that I was in will see 
that the leaders of the Kingston organization 
are not above the law even though they tell 
us that they are, that they can be punished 
for what they do to us, and that we can 
escape and seek recovery for the harm that 
was done to us. I also hope that the people 
that we are bringing this lawsuit against 
will realize the harm they have caused and 
continue to cause, and that they will change 
their ways. 
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Defendants then responded with a reply memorandum in support of 
their motion to dismiss. In the reply memorandum, the Defendants 
argued for the first time that "judicial immunity, an absolute 
privilege to a claim of defamation," protected the Kingston 
Complaint, thereby barring any of the Pratts' defamation claims 
founded on the Kingston Complaint. In addition, the Defendants 
also included an affidavit with their reply memorandum that, 
among other things, averred that the Defendants had only 
generally referred to the defendants named in the Kingston 
Complaint as the "'society,' 'organization,' and 'the Order'" at 
the press conference, never mentioning the Pratts by name. The 
trial court did not exclude the affidavit and thereafter properly 
treated the Defendants' motion, under rule 12 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as a motion for summary judgment. See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b). 
H5 Because the motion to dismiss had been converted into a 
motion for summary judgment, the trial court entered an order 
allowing the parties ten days to submit "all supporting material 
. . . pertinent to the motion for summary judgment." The Pratts 
presented no additional supporting material and neither did the 
Defendants.2 In a separate order, the trial court acknowledged 
that the Defendants had raised the issue of judicial privilege 
for the first time in their reply memorandum and, in the interest 
of fairness, allowed the Pratts an additional eight days to file 
a responsive memorandum, limited to the issue of judicial 
privilege. The Pratts did not file their responsive memorandum 
concerning the issue of judicial privilege until over a month 
after the trial court's deadline for filing the memorandum had 
2. Relying on appellate rule 11, the Pratts filed a motion with 
this court to supplement the record and now seek to add to the 
record a transcript of a video recording of the press conference 
held August 28, 2003. See Utah R. App. P. 11(h) (allowing for 
the "[c]orrection or modification of the record" transmitted to 
this court for the purposes of an appeal " [i]f anything material 
to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident 
or is misstated"). The Pratts contend that they are seeking to 
supplement the record in order to correct one "deliberate and 
wilful falsehood" and one misstatement the Defendants have made 
in their appellate brief about what was said at the press 
conference. We deferred ruling on the motion pending plenary 
consideration of the matter and now deny the Pratts' motion as 
beyond the scope of rule 11. See Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, 
Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that 
the record on appeal may only be supplemented "because of an 
omission or exclusion, or a dispute as to the accuracy of 
reporting, and not to introduce new material into the record") 
(citation omitted). 
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passed. The Pratts offered no explanation for their tardiness in 
filing, nor did they seek an extension of the deadline. The 
Defendants moved to strike the Pratts' late responsive 
memorandum, and in return, the Pratts moved to strike the 
Defendants' judicial privilege argument as improperly raised for 
the first time in a reply memorandum. 
1)6 The trial court granted the Defendants' motion to strike the 
Pratts' memorandum, ruling that the Pratts' late memorandum was 
unauthorized under rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and would, therefore, not be considered. The trial court also 
denied the Pratts' motion to strike the Defendants' judicial 
privilege argument, reasoning that the Pratts had been given the 
opportunity to address the argument but had chosen not to respond 
within the allotted time and were "solely to blame" for their own 
late filing and could not now "complain of unfairness." The 
trial court then proceeded, without a hearing, to rule on the 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
^7 In its ruling, the trial court concluded that the Kingston 
Complaint was covered by the judicial proceeding privilege, which 
"acts as an absolute bar to the Pratts' claim of defamation 
arising from allegations made in [the Kingston Complaint]."3 It 
also concluded that Nelson's Press Statement was not defamatory 
towards the Pratts, as a matter of law, because the statement 
never directly mentioned the Pratts, but only referred to a 
larger group of persons, i.e., "the leaders of the Kingston 
organization," "the people that we are bringing this lawsuit 
against," "the Kingston Polygamist Family," etc. The trial court 
based this conclusion on the Defendants' unrefuted affidavit, 
which set forth what the Defendants said at the press 
conference.4 
3. The trial court based its ruling on the general rule stated 
in Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, 20 P.3d 895, "that judges, 
jurors, witnesses, litigants, and counsel involved in a judicial 
proceeding have an absolute privilege against suits alleging 
defamation." Id. at ^8. The trial court reasoned that the 
complaint was covered by the judicial proceeding privilege 
because the privilege covers "all pleadings and affidavits 
necessary to set the judicial machinery in motion." DeBry v. 
Godbe, 1999 UT 111,^12, 992 P.2d 979 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
4. Because the Pratts did not file any opposing evidence after 
the Defendants' motion to dismiss was properly converted to a 
motion for summary judgment, the trial court rightly concluded 
there was no genuine issue of disputed fact as to what was said 
at the press conference. See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
(continued...) 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
^8 The Pratts ask us to determine whether the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment against them, thereby dismissing 
their claims.5 Summary judgment is proper when "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and [when] the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.* 
56(c). "In reviewing the district court's grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts and inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). "Because summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law, we give the trial court's legal 
conclusions no particular deference." Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, 
Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 333 (Utah 1992). 
|^9 The Pratts also ask us to determine whether the trial court 
erred in striking their untimely memorandum on the issue of 
judicial privilege while refusing to strike the Defendants' 
judicial privilege argument raised for the first time in the 
Defendants' reply memorandum. "Motions to strike pleadings or 
parts thereof are addressed to the judgment and discretion of the 
trial court. A ruling thereon, except under circumstances which 
amount to a clear abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed on 
appeal." Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 
Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 651 (1937) . 
4. (...continued) 
768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (" [W]hen the moving party 
has presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its 
favor, and the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, 
a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of 
fact is present or would be at trial."), cert. denied, 109 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 9 (19 93). 
5. The Defendants argue that the Pratts have not briefed or 
challenged certain aspects of the trial court's ruling, 
contending that the Pratts have waived those issues. Our review 
of the trial court's ruling and the Pratts' arguments on appeal 
reveals, however, that the only aspect of the trial court's 
ruling the Pratts have not meaningfully challenged on appeal is 
the trial court's reasons for dismissing the Pratts' civil 
conspiracy claim. "It is axiomatic that we will presume the 
correctness of lower court rulings that neither party challenges 
on appeal." Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 
UT App 149,^10, 92 P.3d 162. Thus, we do not specifically 
address the dismissal of the Pratts' civil conspiracy claim. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Judicial Privilege 
^10 We first consider the Pratts' argument that the trial court 
erred in striking their late-filed memorandum, as our decision on 
that issue influences other aspects of the Pratts' appeal. The 
trial court ruled that the Pratts' memorandum was "an 
unauthorized memorandum" that the court would not consider and 
granted the Defendants' motion to strike the memorandum. The 
Pratts contend, however, that their memorandum was not 
"unauthorized," but "merely untimely," and that the trial court 
abused its discretion in deciding not to consider it. Moreover, 
the Pratts argue that the trial court's treatment of their 
untimely memorandum and its treatment of the Defendants' late-
raised judicial privilege argument was inconsistent, prejudicial 
to them, and an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
til The Pratts contend that, unlike the harm they suffered when 
the Defendants raised the judicial privilege argument for the 
first time in a reply memorandum, the Defendants would not have 
been prejudiced, nor the trial court inconvenienced, if the court 
had considered the memorandum in spite of its tardiness. While 
the trial court could have, as a matter of judicial power, opted 
to consider the late-filed memorandum, we cannot say that the 
trial court abused its discretion in deciding to strike the 
Pratts' late memorandum. Nor can we say that it abused its 
discretion in permitting the judicial privilege argument to 
remain in issue, even though it was raised for the first time in 
a reply memorandum, or in permitting the Pratts to respond, 
should they desire, within only eight days. 
1112 Generally, appellate courts grant " [a] trial judge . . . 
broad discretion in determining how a [case] shall proceed in his 
or her courtroom." University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 
P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987) . While rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure states that a party's "reply memorandum . . . 
shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the [other 
party's] memorandum in opposition" to a motion, Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(c)(1), the rule also allows the trial court discretion to 
consider other memoranda. See id. ("No other memoranda will 
be considered without leave of the court.") (emphasis added). 
Thus, when an issue is raised for the first time in a reply 
memorandum, a trial court may properly opt to "grant a motion to 
strike issues raised for the first time in a reply memorandum." 
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U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303,1163, 990 P.2d 
945. But 
as a matter of judicial economy, where there 
is no prejudice (i.e., where the opposing 
party is able to respond) and where the 
issues could be raised simply by filing a 
separate motion to dismiss, the trial court 
has discretion to consider arguments raised 
for the first time in a reply memorandum. [6] 
Trillium USA, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 101, H17 
n.3, 37 P.3d 1093. Cf. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 
694, 702 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Nothing prevents the trial 
court from receiving additional memoranda if it wishes to do 
so."). 
H13 Given the facts of this case, we see no abuse of discretion. 
After deciding to consider the Defendants' judicial privilege 
argument, the trial court appropriately allowed the Pratts time 
to respond to the issue with their own memorandum. Thus, the 
Pratts were not blind-sided or otherwise prejudiced by the trial 
court's decision to consider the Defendants' judicial privilege 
argument. 
H14 We also conclude that the trial court's decision to strike 
the Pratts' memorandum as unauthorized after it was filed one 
month too late also falls within the trial court's broad 
discretion to manage the case before it. See Adams v. Portage 
Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 651 
(1937) . Cf . Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) 
(noting that trial courts have the power to impose sanctions to 
control the proceedings before them); Johnson v. Peck, 90 Utah 
544, 63 P.2d 251, 253-54 (1936) (holding that trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing amendments to pleadings because 
they came too late). While the Pratts claim they are prejudiced 
by the trial court's decision to strike their memorandum, it is 
clear that any harm the Pratts suffered is self-inflicted. The 
Pratts filed the memorandum one month later than the trial 
court's deadline, without any effort to explain their lateness or 
to seek an extension of the deadline. The trial court's decision 
6. The trial court in this case may well have been motivated by 
considerations of judicial efficiency and economy. Had the trial 
court refused to consider the judicial privilege issue raised for 
the first time in the Defendants' reply memorandum, the issue was 
one that Defendants could simply have raised by filing another 
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 
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to strike the memorandum falls well short of being arbitrary. 
The Pratts, at their own peril, failed to timely file their 
responsive memorandum on the issue of judicial privilege. 
H15 With the Pratts' memorandum stricken from the trial court's 
consideration, the Defendants' assertions that a judicial 
privilege applied in this case were unopposed and uncontested. • 
Being persuaded by the Defendants' judicial privilege arguments, 
the trial court ruled on summary judgment "that the doctrine of 
judicial privilege acts as an absolute bar to the Pratts' claim 
of defamation arising from allegations made in [the Kingston 
Complaint]." Given what was before the court, this ruling 
appears to be entirely correct. The Pratts now challenge the 
correctness of the trial court's summary judgment determination 
that a judicial privilege applies to the Kingston Complaint. The 
Defendants argue, however, that because of the Pratts' failure to 
timely file their memorandum presenting their legal arguments to 
the trial court, they cannot now ask this court to consider their 
judicial privilege arguments for the first time on appeal. 
^16 The Defendants' argument is well taken. In a situation like 
the instant one, the invited error doctrine comes into play to 
prevent us, for sound policy reasons, from reaching the merits of 
the trial court's ruling on the issue of judicial privilege. 
Utah's appellate courts apply the invited error doctrine, in 
part, "to give the trial court the first opportunity to address 
the claim of error" from which a party may later seek appellate 
relief. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,^12, 86 P.3d 742. This 
is so because, as has been noted, "fairness dictates that the 
trial judge should not be reversed on an issue he [or she] never 
considered, for if the issues had been presented, it is possible 
that no error would have been committed." Justice Michael J. 
Wilkins et al., A "Primer" in Utah State Appellate Practice, 2000 
Utah L. Rev. Ill, 126 (2000) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
H1V While the instant case does not bear the more tell-tale 
signs of a decision by a party to "intentionally mislead [] the 
trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on 
appeal," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993), it does 
implicate the sound rationale behind many cases decided under the 
invited error doctrine. Our aippellate courts "have held 
repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." Id. Indeed, the alleged error from which 
the Pratts now seek appellate relief was caused, in no small 
part, by the Pratts' own disregard for the trial court's deadline 
for responding to the newly-raised issue of judicial privilege. 
The Pratts were put on notice that the trial court intended to 
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consider the merits of the Defendants' judicial privilege 
argument, and they were given a specific opportunity to argue 
their side of the issue to the trial court and explain why 
judicial privilege should not apply. 
^18 The Pratts, however, did not see fit to file their 
memorandum in a timely manner, nor did they explain their 
lateness and seek more time to file the memorandum. Had the 
Pratts responded in a timely manner, the error they now allege in 
the trial court's ruling would have been brought to the trial 
court's attention and possibly avoided. We conclude that the 
Pratts cannot simply disregard the trial court's deadline, have 
their late memorandum stricken as a result, and expect to be able 
to nevertheless have the trial court reversed on appeal if it 
decided the issue incorrectly without the aid of their 
memorandum. 
II. Group Defamation 
i|l9 While the trial court applied the judicial proceeding 
privilege to the Kingston Complaint, the trial court did not 
definitively rule that Nelson's Press Statement was also covered 
by the privilege.7 Instead, the trial court ruled, as a matter 
of law, that the Pratts could not, without relying on the 
Kingston Complaint, show that any of the alleged defamatory 
statements refer to them because the Pratts were never mentioned 
in Nelson's Press Statement nor did the circumstances imply any 
reference to the Pratts.8 It therefore concluded that the 
7. In its ruling, the trial court noted that it "cannot say 
unequivocally that the press statement is not covered by the 
judicial proceeding privilege," and put forth reasons why it 
arguably "could be protected by judicial privilege." Yet the 
trial court ultimately relied on other grounds in dismissing the 
Pratts' defamation claims insofar as they were premised on 
statements other than those made in the Kingston Complaint, which 
leads us to conclude that the trial court's insights on whether 
the judicial privilege extended to Nelson's Press Statement never 
culminated in an actual legal ruling. 
8. In the trial court's view, none of Nelson's allegedly 
defamatory statements ever directly mentioned the Pratts by name 
and, aside from the Kingston Complaint, none of the extrinsic 
facts and circumstances demonstrated that the statements were 
intended to specifically refer to the Pratts. The trial court 
found that the allegedly defamatory statements merely referred 
generally to large groups of people, i.e., "the Kingston 
(continued...) 
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alleged defamatory statements could not be interpreted by a 
reasonable jury to be libelous or slanderous towards the Pratts. 
The Pratts argue, however, that even if Utah law recognizes a 
"so-called" group defamation rule, they may be able to convince a 
jury that the words used by the Defendants at the press 
conference, even without the aid of the Kingston Complaint, 
referred to them and that they should, therefore, have been 
allowed to proceed to trial. 
1]20 It is clear under Utah law that defamatory statements 
concerning a group or class of people may not be actionable by 
each individual member of the defamed group or class. "In order 
to state a claim for defamation under Utah law, a plaintiff must 
show [, among other things,] 'that defendants published the 
statements concerning him [either in print or by spoken words] 
. . . .'" Wavment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25,^18 
n.2, 116 P.3d 271 (emphasis added) (second alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). Thus, under Utah law, in order for 
defamatory statements "to be regarded actionable they must refer 
to some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must 
be the person complaining, shown to be such by directly being 
named, or so intended from the extrinsic facts and 
circumstances." Lynch v. Standard Publ'g Co., 51 Utah 322, 170 
P. 770, 773 (1918). See also Fenstermaker v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 
12 Utah 439, 43 P. 112, 114 (1895) (stating that defamatory 
statements "must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable 
person" in order to be actionable). It follows then, as the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated, that 
where words defamatory in their character 
seem to apply to a particular class of 
individuals, and are not specifically 
defamatory of any particular member of the 
class, an action can be maintained by any 
individual of the class who may be able to 
show the words referred to himself. 
Lynch, 170 P. at 773 (emphasis added). See also Fenstermaker, 43 
P. at 114; W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law 
of Torts § 111, at 784 (5th ed. 1984). It also necessarily 
follows, however, that "[w]here the defamatory matter has no 
special application and is so general that no individual damages 
can be presumed, and the class referred to is so numerous that 
8. (...continued) 
Polygamist Family," "leaders of the Kingston organization," etc., 
and not the Pratts specifically, thus barring their action for 
defamation. 
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great vexation and oppression might grow out of a multiplicity of 
suits, no private suit can be maintained." Lynch, 170 P. at 774 
(emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). See 
Fenstermaker, 43 P. at 114; W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 111, at 784 (5th ed. 1984). 
i|21 The Restatement' s "Defamation of a Group or Class" rule, 
which we apply to the instant case, concisely states the 
principles Utah case law has espoused in the group defamation 
context: 
One who publishes defamatory matter 
concerning a group or class of persons is 
subject to liability to an individual member 
of it if, but only if, 
(a) the group or class is so small that 
the matter can reasonably be understood to 
refer to the member, or 
(b) the circumstances of publication 
reasonably give rise to the conclusion that 
there is particular reference to the member. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A (1977) (emphasis added). 
The Pratts argue that under the above rules a jury could 
reasonably make the connection between the Pratts and the 
statements made during the press conference, even without 
reference to the Kingston Complaint, but the facts of this case 
prevent that conclusion. Indeed, without the aid of the Kingston 
Complaint, the Defendants' statements at the press conference 
cannot reasonably be understood to refer, with any particularity, 
to the Pratts. 
H22 The only place where the Pratts are identified by name is in 
the Kingston Complaint, where they are listed with some 200 other 
individual defendants. Without the Kingston Complaint, the 
Pratts can only point to the Defendants' group references and 
argue that such statements defame them as individuals. 
Admittedly, under the right circumstances the references to a 
group such as "the Kingston Polygamist Family" might reasonably 
be understood to refer to an individual surnamed Kingston. See 
Fenstermaker, 43 P. at 114 (allowing head of a family to maintain 
an action for defamation where defamatory statements were made 
about "a family named Fenstermaker"). But see Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 564A cmt. a, illus. 1 (1977) (giving 
hypothetical example where defamatory statements about a large 
family would not be actionable by individual family members). In 
fact, if the Pratts were widely known as members of "the Kingston 
Polygamist Family," the Pratts might very well be able to 
maintain an action on such statements, even without referring to 
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the Kingston Complaint. See Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 
P.2d 42, 51-52 (Okla. 1962) (holding that a single member of a 
large university football team could maintain a lawsuit for libel 
for general statements about the team since he was "well known 
and identified in connection with the group" and because he 
"ha[d] sufficiently established his identity as one of those 
libeled by the publication"), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 513 (1964): 
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A cmt. b (observing 
that a statement such as "'That jury was bribed' may reasonably 
be understood to mean that each of the twelve jurymen has 
accepted a bribe," giving each member a cause of action for 
defamation). Cf. id. § 564A cmt. a (observing that the statement 
"'All lawyers are shysters,' . . . cannot ordinarily be taken to 
have personal reference to any of the class"). The nature and 
size of the group must be such that "the words may reasonably be 
understood to have personal reference and application to any 
member of it, so that he is defamed as an individual." Id. 
§ 564A cmt. b. 
1]23 In the instant case, the nature and size of the groups 
referred to, and the circumstances of publication, do not lend 
themselves to any reasonable understanding that they have 
personal application to the Pratts. While the Pratts argue that 
it is for a jury to decide whether they can be connected to 
Defendants' statements about the group or groups mentioned, we 
conclude that the trial court properly resolved the issue on 
summary judgment. Indeed, there is nothing in the record before 
us, other than the Kingston Complaint, that makes a connection 
between the Pratts and the group or groups identified in the 
Defendants' statements. There was no dispute of fact that only 
general references were made at the press conference to groups 
and that the Pratts were never mentioned by name, and nothing in 
the record gives rise to any sort of reasonable understanding 
that the Pratts were included in the extrajudicial references to 
these groups. We therefore conclude that the trial court 
properly disposed of this issue on summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
1124 We do not reach the merits of the Pratts' challenge on 
appeal against the trial court's application of the judicial 
proceeding privilege to the Kingston Complaint, because the 
Pratts invited any error in the trial court's ruling. As a 
result, we affirm the trial court's ruling dismissing the Pratts' 
claims that are founded upon their names appearing in the 
Kingston Complaint. Consequently, the Pratts cannot rely on any 
references to them in the Kingston Complaint to support their 
claims based on statements the Defendants made at the press 
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conference. The Defendants' statements cannot, therefore, be 
reasonably understood to refer to the Pratts without the aid of 
the Kingston Complaint. The only other statements alleged to be 
defamatory refer to larger amorphous groups and are not 
actionable by the Pratts. Thus, the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling in favor of the Defendants was proper. 
1)2 5 Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1}26 WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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This matter is before the Court on: (1) plaintiff Pratt's Motion to Consolidate; (2) 
defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff Pratt's Supplemental Memorandum; (3) plaintiff Pratt's 
Motion to Strike Defendants' "Judicial Privilege" Argument; (4) plaintiff Hansens' Motion to 
Strike Defendants' Request to Submit; (5) defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Hansens' 
Action; (6) and defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Pratts' claims. The Court 
has read the parties' moving and responding papers and for the reasons set forth below, rules as 
follows; the Court: (1) grants plaintiff Pratt's Motion to Consolidate; (2) grants defendants' 
Motion to Strike Plaintiff Pratt's Supplemental Memorandum; (3) denies plaintiff Pratt's Motion 
to Strike Defendants' "Judicial Privilege" Argument; (4) denies plaintiff Hansens' Motion to 
Strike Defendants' Request to Submit; (5) grants defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff 
Hansens' Action without prejudice; and (6) grants defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as 
to the Pratts' claims. Finding the issues to be clear, and the briefing complete, the Court finds a 
hearing would not aid it in making a decision and denies defendants' request for hearing. 
BACKGROUND 
This matter concerns the Pratts and Hansens' claims of defamation against defendants, 
which defamation allegedly occurred at a press conference August 28, 2003 held by defendant 
Mary Ann Nelson, a.k.a. Mary Ann Kingston and Mary Ann Roe, and her attorneys from the law 
firm McKay, Burton & Thurman. 
Defendant Mary Ann Nelson (referred to as Mary Ann Nelson in the Pratts' Complaint) 
was born into a family that allegedly practiced polygamy, among a society of other polygamist 
families; defendants referred to the society as "the Order", "the Coop", and "the Kingston 
Organization", and the "Kingston Polygamist Family." Defendant Mary Ann Nelson ("Nelson") 
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left the society and later filed a civil action against several members of the society (Case No. 
030917113 before the Hon. William Barrett, Utah Third District Court) alleging—among other 
claims—sexual abuse of a child, seduction, assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs in this matter are 
among about 389 named defendants in the civil action in the Third District Court. 
On August 28, 2003, defendant and her attorneys—also defendants in this matter —held a 
press conference. Various members of the Utah press attended, as well as at least one national 
press association, the Associated Press. Defendants distributed copies of the Complaint filed in 
defendant Kingston's civil action to members of the press attending; the Complaint was the only 
document that contained plaintiffs' name. Defendants referred to allegations in their Complaint 
and generally alleged in a statement that members of the society committed the acts. At the press 
conference, however, plaintiffs were never specifically identified, named or referenced. 
Defendants distributed only two documents at the press conference: a copy of the Complaint 
filed in the civil action, and a copy of defendant Nelson's written statement which she read at the 
press conference and which went to at most three members of the press. The written statement 
reads: 
Mary Ann's Statement to the Press 
My name is Mary Ann and I was raised in the Kingston Polygamist Family. I 
escaped when I was 16 years old. I am pursuing this lawsuit with the hope that other 
young girls and boys in the same position that I was in will see that the leaders of the 
Kingston organization are not above the law even though they tell us that they are, 
that they can be punished for what they do to us, and that we can escape and seek 
recovery for the harm that was done to us. 1 also hope that the people that we are 
bringing this lawsuit against will realize the harm they have caused and continue to 
cause, and that they will change their ways. 
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Plaintiffs, both the Pratts and Hansens, each filed a civil action against defendants, 
alleging defamation-both slander and libel, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs 
sought injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Pratts filed their claim on February 11, 
2004 before this Court. F. Mark Hansen and Suzanne Hansen filed their claim on April 9, 2004, 
in this District, but in the Bountiful Department before the Hon. Glen R. Dawson (Case No. 
040800519). The claims, defendants, and underlying facts before Judge Dawson are identical to 
those before this Court. The Hansens filed a Motion to Consolidate and Judge Dawson granted 
their Motion. The Pratts also filed a Motion to Consolidate this Motion with the Hansen matter; 
defendants did not respond to the Motion. 
Defendants in this matter filed their Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum 
March 4, 2004. The Pratts filed their Response March 15, 2004. Defendants filed their Reply 
March 24, 2004 along with the Affidavit of William A. Mark. The Court accepted the Affidavit 
and in an Order of April 12, 2004, allowed all parties ten days to submit all supporting materials 
made pertinent to the defendants' Motion, i.e. opposing affidavits by the Pratts. Neither the 
Pratts, nor defendants submitted further supporting materials. The Court having accepted matters 
outside the pleadings, defendants' Motion to Dismiss, before this Court, was converted to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants filed their Request to Submit on their Motion for 
Summary Judgment June 23, 2004. 
Defendants, however, raised an argument for the first time in their Reply that was not 
raised in their initial memorandum. They argued that the Complaint filed in the Third District 
Court, serving as the basis for plaintiffs' claims, is covered by judicial privilege and absolutely 
bars plaintiffs' libel claims. In the interest of fairness, the Court, in an Order signed May 7, 
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2004, allowed the Pratts eight days1 from the signing of the Order (the Pratts' supplemental 
memorandum was due by May 19, 2004) to respond solely to defendants' argument regarding 
judicial privilege. The Pratts failed to respond within eight days, and instead filed their 
supplemental memorandum almost one month after the due date, on June 17, 2004. 
On May 5, 2004, the Pratts filed an amended Complaint. 
On June 23, 2004, defendants filed their Motion to Strike the Pratts' late supplemental 
memorandum. On July 16, 2004, the Pratts' filed their opposition to defendant's Motion to 
Strike. The Pratts also filed their own Motion to Strike on July 16, 2004, arguing that 
defendants' judicial privilege argument was improper and should be stricken. 
In the Hansen matter, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss May 4, 2004. The Hansens 
were served with the Motion and failed to respond within the ten day period allowed by Rule 7 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 23, 2004, defendants filed their Request to Submit 
their Motion to Dismiss. Also, on June 23, 2004, the Hansens filed their Objection to the 
Request to Submit, arguing that they did respond to the Motion to Dismiss by filing a Motion to 
Consolidate their action with the Pratts'. 
ANALYSIS 
Motion to Consolidate 
Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs consolidation. It states in part: 
"When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may 
Rule 7 allows the moving party five days after the service of the memo in opposition to file their reply; 
the Court allowed the Pratts the same five days to reply to the judicial privilege argument plus an additional three 
days. As this time period was less than ten days, the eight-day period did not include Saturdays or Sundays. 
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order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the 
actions consolidated; . . . ." Rule 42(a)(1) says: "A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard by 
the judge assigned to the first case filed." 
The Pratts filed their Motion to Consolidate their matter with the Hansen's before this 
Court, arguing that both actions involved common questions of law or fact. Defendants' failed to 
respond to the Motion and the time for response is passed. The Court, therefore, grants the Pratts 
Motion to Consolidate. As both the Hansen and Pratt matters are now consolidated, "the case 
number of the first case filed shall be used for all subsequent papers . . . ." Utah R.Civ.P. 
42(a)(2). 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff Pratt's Supplemental Memorandum 
Defendants argued for the first time in their Reply to the Pratts' objection that judicial 
privilege precluded the Pratts' defamation claims. The Court gave the Pratts ample time-eight 
days-to file a supplemental memo giving a limited response to the "judicial privilege" argument. 
The Pratts ignored the Court's Order and merely filed their memo one month late, giving no 
reason for their late delay. Their supplemental memorandum was therefore an unauthorized 
memorandum and per Rule 7(c)(1) will not be considered; the Pratts' supplemental memo is 
hereby stricken. 
The Pratts Motion to Strike Defendants ' "Judicial Privilege" Argument 
Having ignored the Court's order allowing them time to respond to the "judicial 
privilege" argument, the Pratts now complain that the argument raised by defendants for the first 
time in their Reply, was improper as it deprived the Pratts of the chance to respond to the 
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argument. The Pratts also argue that if the Court strikes plaintiffs memo addressing judicial 
privilege, the Court should also strike defendants' judicial privilege argument from the Reply 
Memorandum. 
The Court will not strike defendants' "judicial privilege" argument. Because the Court 
recognized that the Pratts' did not have opportunity to respond to the "judicial privilege" 
argument, the Court allowed the Pratts leave to file a supplemental memo within eight days. 
The Pratts chose to not comply with the Court's Order giving them opportunity to respond to the 
argument and the Court will not now penalize defendants for the Pratts' tardiness. The Pratts are 
solely to blame for their own late filings and cannot complain of unfairness. Their Motion to 
Strike is denied. 
Plaintiff Hansens' Motion to Strike Defendants' Request to Submit 
Rule 7(c)(1) allows a party ten days to respond to a Motion, in this case, defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. The Hansens' failed to oppose defendants' motion filed May 4, 2004. They 
filed no opposition to the Motion nor did they give any reason for not responding. On June 23, 
2004, well past the ten-day period allowed for the Hansens' response, defendants' filed their 
Request to Submit, requesting the Court dismiss the Hansens' claims without prejudice. Also on 
June 23, 2004, the Hansens filed their Motion to Strike defendants' Request to Submit. They 
argued that they did respond to the Motion to Dismiss by filing a Motion to Consolidate. They 
further argued that the Motion to Consolidate was granted and that defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss was rendered moot by the consolidation. The Hansen's provided no case law or other 
authority for their arguments. 
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Rule 7(c)(1) is clear: "a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition" within ten days. The Hansens filed no such memo in opposition to defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. There is no basis in Rule 7 for their contention that their Motion to 
Consolidate served as a response to defendants' Motion to Dismiss or that the granting of the 
Motion to Consolidate mooted defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Hansens failed to follow the 
mandates of Rule 7; their time had passed for filing their opposition memo and the briefing was 
therefore complete. Once the briefing was complete, defendants could file their request to 
submit. Defendants' Request to Sumbit will not be stricken and the Hansen's Motion is denied. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff'Hansens' Action 
Defendants properly filed the requirements of Rule 7(d) and there being no opposition to 
their Motion to Dismiss, the Court accordingly grants their Motion to Dismiss the Hansens' 
complaint without prejudice. 
Defendants ' Motion for Summaiy Judgment as to the Pratts' claims 
Defendants' originally filed a Motion to Dismiss, but matters outside of the pleadings 
were presented to the Court, i.e. the Affidavit. Rule 12(b) states: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated 
as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such 
a motion by Rule 56. 
The Court did not exclude the Affidavit and gave the parties reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to the motion. Specifically, the Court issued an Order on 
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April 12, 2004 allowing all parties to submit additional materials, i.e. affidavits. If the Pratts had 
desired to file any opposing affidavits, they could have so done; they did not. Having accorded 
both parties the chance to submit additional affidavits before converting the 12(b)(6) Motion to 
one for judgment as a matter of law, the Court will now treat defendants' Motion as one for 
summary judgment. 
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact.. . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Additionally, when a summary 
judgment motion is made and supported as provided for under Rule 56, "an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment. . . shall be entered." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e); see also Home Builders Ass 'n. v. City ofN. Logan, 1999 UT 63, 983 P.2d 561. The Pratts 
claim defendants published both libelous and slanderous statements about them in the August 
2003 news conference. They also made two claims against defendants for invasion of privacy, 
one claim of civil conspiracy, and prayed for monetary and injunctive relief. The Court will 
address each claim individually. 
Libel 
The Pratts continually referred, in their Complaint and in their pleadings, to "libelous 
documents" or to a "libelous document" but never specifically identified the nature of the alleged 
libelous documents. Nelson's attorney submitted an affidavit with attached exhibits which for 
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the first time identified the allegedly libelous documents, which were merely a copy of the 
complaint and a copy of Nelson's press conference statement. The Court will first address the 
Pratts' claims regarding the complaint and then their claims regarding distributed copies of 
Nelson's statement to the press. 
As to Nelson's complaint filed in Third District Court, regardless of the statements 
contained in it, the Court holds that the doctrine of judicial privilege acts as an absolute bar to the 
Pratts' claim of defamation arising from allegations made in that complaint. "The general rule is 
that judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants, and counsel involved in a judicial proceeding have an 
absolute privilege against suits alleging defamation." Kronse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, f^lj 8, 20 
P.3d 895. That privilege covers "all pleadings and affidavits necessary to set the judicial 
machinery in motion." DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, Iffl 12, 992 P.2d 979; see also Bennett v. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ffi[ 77, 70 P.3d 17 (citing to Janklow v. 
Keller, 241 N.W.2d 364, 367-70 (S.D. 1976) (holding that plaintiffs claims arising from 
complaints filed by defendant law firm and alleging that the complaints were filed to injure 
plaintiff and mislead the courts were absolutely barred by judicial proceeding privilege). 
Nelson's complaint was filed to set the judicial process in motion and even if she had made 
certain defamatory statements in the complaint, the Pratts could not maintain a cause of action 
for defamation based solely on statements within that complaint. 
The Court also finds that the distribution of copies of the complaint did not destroy the 
privilege. See DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111 at ffif 21 (holding that "communications that are 
otherwise privileged lose their privilege if the statement is excessively published . . . ."). The 
Page 10 of 18 
complaint was a matter of public record that named over 300 defendants. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-103 (18)-(19), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-201 (l)-(2). Defendants did not excessively 
publish that which could have already been accessed or copied by any person attending the press 
conference. As a matter of law, defendants cannot be held liable for defamation for making 
allegedly defamatory statements in the complaint and then distributing copies of the complaint. 
The Court also holds that statements contained in the copies of Nelson's statement 
distributed to some members of the press are not defamatory as a matter of law. When dealing 
with defamation on a motion for summary judgment, the court, as a matter of law, first decides 
whether the allegedly defamatory statements could be interpreted by a reasonable jury to be 
susceptible of a libelous meaning. Kelly v. Schmidberger, 806 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1986). In 
order to be considered a libelous meaning, however, the party complaining of the statement must 
first show the statement refers to them. Lynch v. StandardPubl'g Co., 170 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 
1918). Nothing in Nelson's distributed statement ever directly mentions the Pratts, nor could any 
of the extrinsic facts and circumstances show that the statement was intended to specifically refer 
to the Pratts. Nelson's statements referred to the Pratts only generally as part of a larger group of 
about 389 named defendants and 1000 unnamed defendants. The language in the statements 
distributed to the press mention refer only to large groups, i.e. the "Kingston Family 
Organization", "leaders of the Kingston organization", and "the people that we are bringing this 
lawsuit against." Our Supreme Court has stated that where the allegedly libelous material "'has 
no special application and is so general that no individual damages can be presumed, and the 
class referred to is so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of a 
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multiplicity of suits, no private suit can be maintained.'" Lynch, 170 P.2d at 774 (quoting 25 
Cyc. 363); see also Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 43 P.l 12, 114 (Utah 1895) 
{"Fenstermaker /"). 
Our high court, however, also stated that where the words refer only to a class of 
individuals, yet can be interpreted as referring to an individual or limited individuals, that person 
or those persons can maintain an action for libel. Id. at 773. This would seem to indicate a 
factual issue, improper for the Court to decide at this point. The Court finds, however, that given 
the language in the press statement, no reasonable jury could interpret those words to refer to the 
Pratts directly. There was nothing in the statement or in the circumstances in which it was made, 
that would lead a reasonable jury to believe that Nelson intended to direct her words to the Pratts 
only and not refer to the larger group of almost 400 named defendants. In fact, Nelson stated that 
her action was commenced to ensure that the "people we are bringing this lawsuit against" stop 
what she claims are harmful and illegal acts, not just to stop allegedly illegal acts the Pratts are 
committing or committed. 
The Pratts, in arguments supporting their claims, quoted language from Fenstermaker v. 
Tribune Pub. Co, 45 P.1097, 1098 (Utah 1896) (? Fenstermaker IF) -making certain alterations, 
and argued that Fenstermaker II states that, "one who publishes matter about a [group] in its 
collective capacity assumes the risk of its being libelous as to any member thereof. Any other 
rule . . . would permit indiscriminating reference to the deed of a single member of the [group] as 
the deed of all collectively . . . ." Fenstermaker II, however, uses the word "family" and not 
"group" which changes the entire meaning of the statement. A family is much smaller than the 
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group of 389 named defendants of which the Pratts are a part. In fact, Fenstermaker II, involved 
only statements about a family living on a ranch, not a group of 389 defendants. Also, in 
Fenstermaker I, the court clearly stated that had a defamatory statement been made charging the 
citizens of the county with the same reprehensible conduct as the Fenstermakers, and had some 
county residents complained of defamation, "the class so charged would be so extensive, the 
impossibility of fixing individual responsibility so apparent, that the court would pronounce the 
[statement] not actionable." The Pratts are among only a larger group of people against whom 
allegedly libelous publications were made. As such, no reasonable jury could interpret the 
statement to refer to them specifically and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
on this point. 
Additionally, the Court cannot say unequivocally that the press statement is not covered 
by the judicial proceeding privilege. The privilege covers not just complaints, but is interpreted 
broadly, DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111 at 1fl[ 14, and covers statements made by litigants and 
their attorneys preliminary to proposed judicial proceedings. Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28 at 
T[f9. To establish this privilege, the statement must be "(1) 'made during or in the course of a 
judicial proceeding'; (2) "have some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding'; and (3) 
be 'made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel.'" 
DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111 at ^ 11 (quoting Price v. Armor, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 
1997)-. The first prong is met as the statement was made during a judicial proceeding, at least 
once the complaint had been filed; even if the complaint had not yet been filed, the privilege 
would still cover statements made preliminary to filing the complaint. The statement made 
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reference to the subject matter, i.e. it stated the purpose of Nelson's complaint and what she 
hoped to gain from the filing. Finally, the statement was made by a litigant, Nelson herself. 
Arguably, the statement could be protected by judicial privilege and therefore would bar the 
Pratts claims. 
Slander and False Light/Invasion of Privacy 
The Court will analyze the Pratt's slander and false light/invasion of privacy claims 
together as M[a] false light claim is cclosely allied' with an action for defamation, and cthe same 
considerations apply to each.'" Stein v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 380 
(Utah 1997) (quoting Cibenko v. Worth Pub's, Inc., 510 F.Supp. 761, 766-67 (D.N.J. 1981). 
Before analyzing the merits of the Pratts' claims, the Court first addresses arguments presented 
by defendants concerning the adequacy of the Pratts' pleadings. 
Defendants argue that the Pratts fails to identify specifically which statements they claims 
are defamatory. Defendants argue that the pleadings must identify on their face which statements 
are allegedly defamatory, i.e reproduce, verbatim, statements which are defamatory, in order to 
allow the court to determine whether the statements can be considered defamatory and to allow 
the defendant to mount a proper defense. Defendants properly cite to several Utah cases dealing 
with defamation where in each case, the party complaining of defamation set forth the 
defamatory statements verbatim. 
The Pratts also correctly cite to federal law determining the sufficiency of defamation 
claims in light of Rule 8(a) and Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which rules 
contain federal pleading requirements and are practically identical to Utah's pleading rules. The 
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federal case law states that the rules impose no special pleading requirements on defamation as is 
imposed on claims of fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, etc. Additionally, some federal opinions 
hold that complaints which have not set forth verbatim the allegedly defamatory statements have 
been held sufficient. Given the liberality of our states notice pleading statutes, the Pratts argue, 
the only requirement placed on pleading defamation is that they set forth a short and plain 
statement giving the nature and basis of the claim asserted-which they say they did. 
Though some federal courts might determine that a defamation claim is sufficient without 
stating verbatim the allegedly defamatory language, it seems clear that in Utah, a mere statement 
that a party made "defamatory communications", distributed "libelous documents," or made 
publications which placed a party in a false light is insufficient to meet the standards of even 
Rule 8(a). See Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). The Williams 
court recognized that although our liberalized pleading rules allow parties to present whatever 
legitimate contentions they have, "an allegation of'certain derogatory and libelous statements' is 
insufficient; a complaint for defamation must set forth 'the language complained of. . . in words 
or words to that effect " Williams, 656 P.2d at 971 (quoting Dennett v. Smith, 445 P.2d 983, 
984 (Utah 1968)) (emphasis in original). The only specific language that could be considered 
"words to [the] effect" of being defamatory, are words contained in Nelson's Third District 
complaint and which the Pratts merely restate in their own Complaint. The Pratts refer only 
vaguely to the slanderous statements as "defamatory communications." The Pratts' Complaint 
set forth no other defamatory words verbatim or words to that effect which would show which 
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statements made by Nelson at the press conference were slanderous or placed them in a false 
light. 
Given that the Pratts have set forth no specific defamatory language, the Court must look 
to the affidavits, not merely pleadings, to determine what was actually said. William Mark's 
Affidavit affirmed that the statement read at the press conference contained no specific 
references to the Pratt's; he stated that this was the only statement read by Nelson. The Pratts' 
have merely rested on their pleadings when alleging the defamatory matter and have set forth no 
affidavit which would dispute what William Mark affirms was the only statement made by 
Nelson at the press conference. There being no factual dispute as to what Nelson said, the Court 
finds that no reasonable jury could interpret what she did say as slanderous or as placing the 
Pratts in a false light. 
Even if the statement was slanderous, the statement does not slander the Pratts directly 
nor does it place them in a false light for essentially the same reason that Nelson did not libel 
plaintiff: no reasonable jury could interpret those statements as concerning the Pratts directly. 
The allegedly slanderous statements only refer to the Pratts as part of a larger of group of 
hundreds of defendants. They being only part of a larger group, they cannot maintain a cause of 
action for slander or for false light/invasion of privacy as the slanderous material '"has no special 
application'" to the Pratts '"and is so general that no individual damages can be presumed, and 
the class referred to is so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of a 
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multiplicity of suits."' Lynch, 170 P.2d at 774 (quoting 25 Cyc. 363). The Pratts slander and 
false light/invasion of privacy claims cannot be maintained.2 
Civil Conspiracy Claim 
The Pratts' pleadings as to civil conspiracy are again vague. They seemingly allege that 
defendants either conspired to file a complaint filled with defamatory statements, or conspired to 
hold a press conference where they would defame the Pratts. The Court has already held that 
defendants did not slander the Pratts in the press conference; therefore, that press conference 
cannot serve as a basis for a claim of civil conspiracy. As to the complaint, the filing of a 
complaint is a lawful act. Even if there was a conspiracy to file a complaint that contained 
defamatory statements, and where the complaint's content would be privileged, it is unlikely that 
would be actionable. "If the object of the alleged conspiracy or the means used to attain it is 
lawful, even if damages result to the plaintiff or the defendant acted with malicious motive, there 
can be no civil action for conspiracy." Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, Yi 12, 
42 P.3d 1253. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this point as well. 
Dated August / / , 2004. 
~ Additionally, the Court believes that the judicial proceeding pnvilege analysis might well apply here and 
bar the slander and invasion of privacy claims. 
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